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\title {Social Cognition \\ Lecture 01}

\maketitle

Lecture 01:

Social Cognition

[email protected]

\def \ititle {Lecture 01}

\def \isubtitle {Social Cognition}

\begin{center}

{\Large

\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle

}

\iemail %

\end{center}

\section{The Topic}

the domain

What are theories of social cognition theories of?

‘For humans, like many animal species, survival depends on effective social functioning. Social skills facilitate our access to sustenance, protection and mates, and socially adept individuals tend to be healthier and live longer. However, social interaction in humans is exceedingly complex compared with that in other animal species: representations of internal somatic [action-guiding] states, knowledge about the self, perceptions of others and interpersonal motivations are carefully orchestrated to support skilled social functioning. This complex set of processes [...] is broadly referred to as social cognition’ \citep[p.~268]{amodio:2006_meeting}

‘For humans, like many animal species,
survival depends on effective social functioning. [...]

‘survival depends on effective social functioning’. I don’t think the importance of this point can be overstated, and I would go further. Selves, if distinct from animals, exist only as nodes in a social network. Take away the social and you are left without the people.

Humans are proudly selfish animals. Which is odd because to be proud of selfishness shows that you’ve misunderstood the deep interconnections between the existence of the self and its social network.

‘However, social interaction in humans is exceedingly complex compared with that in other animal species:

How so?

‘representations of
internal somatic [action-guiding] states,
knowledge about the self,
perceptions of others and
interpersonal motivations
are carefully orchestrated to support skilled social functioning.

This complex set of processes [...] is broadly referred to as social cognition’

Amodio & Frith, 2006 p. 268

What processes?

The authors have just mentioned representations, now they’re talking about processes. These are metaphysically distinct: processes unfold over time, whereas representations are states of things.

I think the ‘set of processes’ must refer to the processes involved in orchestrating these representations in the support of ‘skilled social functioning’.

[Working definition v1]

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

Working definition

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

How good is this working definition?

According to a textbook,

[q1] ‘One of the fundamental problems of social cognition is how we represent and understand other people.’

This fits nicely with our definition.

Todorov, Fiske and Prentice, 2011

\citep{todorov:2011_social}

But the textbook mentions another question ...

This question fits less well with our definition. The truth is, the term ‘social cognition’ is widely used in lots of different ways.

This course will focus, roughly, on the first question.

Our definition fits what we will do in this course, but doesn’t match what you will find in lots of textbooks.

This isn’t a matter of principle. My ultimate goal is to explore philosophical issues in social cognition. I’m not doing group identity just because I don’t yet know anything about it.

Note that we shouldn’t be persuaded that there is a problem yet.

What is a problem? It’s a question that is difficult to answer. What is it to grasp a problem? It is to understand both the question *and* what makes it difficult to answer.

The question is, How do we represent and understand other people? So far we’ve seen no difficulties in answering this question. As a matter of fact, it is difficult. But since we don’t yet understand the difficulties, we do not yet understand the problem.

OK, so I’m happy with our definition for now. All I’m stressing is that we don’t yet know what the problems are.

Working definition

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

While we’re thinking about how to define social cognition, consider another textbook definition ...

‘Social cognition is the study of how people make sense of other people and themselves’ \citep[p.~1]{fiske:2013_social}

vs:

‘Social cognition is the study of how people make sense of other people and themselves
‘... in order to coordinate with their social world’

Fiske and Taylor, 2013 pp. 1, 16

It’s a process, not a study

Appealing to ‘make sense’ is too intellectualist. A key theme in these lectures will be that whereas philosophers and others have standardly focussed on humans at their most reflective, a lot of social cognition is implicit. It involves perceptual and motor processes which are largely automatic. This is perhaps the great discovery about social cognition, and a key source of problems.

This is very cool. I would love to include the self. Philosophers have thought a lot about what the self might be (e.g. is it the animal). In doing this, they have largely neglected a very simple point. Philosophical views about the self are mainly based on guesses (or ‘intuitions’). These guesses have their roots in ordinary thinking about the self. So by studying that ordinary thinking about the self and its cognitive sources, we can get a better handle on what the self might be and why, if at all, we should value it.

So far, then, this is our working definition of social cognition.

Turn to the person nearest you. Is there anything unclear about this definition? Do you have any objections or questions about it?

Working definition

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

I’m not entirely happy with our definition. I think it can be simplified.

Talk of ‘orchestrating representations’ sounds like we’re experts, but really most of us have no clue what either ‘orchestration’ or ‘representation’ pick out. (I just took this from the quote.)

Why skilled specifically?

And while we’re at it, why are we referring to processes here? Our interest is not in just any old process, but in cognitive processes specifically.

We can therefore simply and improve our definition

[Working definition v2]

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

Switching from talk of processes to cognition is helpful because it forces us to clarify what we mean by ‘cognition’, at least in a preliminary way.

What does ‘cognition’ mean? Sometimes the term ‘cognition’ is used in contrast to ‘perception’, ‘emotion’ or ‘motor process’. But not here.

In these lectures I’m using ‘cognition’ broadly. It includes processes underpinning perception, emotion and action.

the domain

What are theories of social cognition theories of?

So now we’ve answered one question. The question was about the domain of social cognition: What are theories of social cognition theories of?

The answer is given by our working definition.

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

some questions

What forms of social cognition are there?

What forms of social cognition are there? As already mentioned, there has been a lot of emphasis, especially in philosophy, on the sort of intellectual powers characteristic of humans at their most reflective. This is the ‘sherlock holmes’ form of social cognition.

But much research shows that not all of social cognition is of the ‘sherlock holmes’ form. One challenge for us is to identify other forms of social cognition? For example, can we perceive mental states? And are the processes involved in action control also involved in social cognition?

Recognising that there are multiple forms of social cognition raises further questions. In particular, How do different forms of social cognition have synergistic effects?

Do any nonhumans track others’ mental states?

How could interaction support social cognition?

What are the functions of social cognition?

It is perhaps tempting to assume that the function of social cognition is simply to produce an accurate representations of others’ minds and actions.

By comparison: the key function of physical cognition is to enable you to produce, as efficiently as possible, representations of the physical world which are as accurate as possible.

Can we think of social cognition in the same way? Is the key function of social cognition to enable you to produce, as efficiently as possible, representations of the mental world which are as accurate as possible?

In line with this view, some people think social cognition primarily for predicting others’, and perhaps for explaining their actions.

But one reason for thinking that it might not be is reflection on norms. Think about norms of rationality, ethical norms governing actions. Representions of minds and actions are shot through with norms. These can influence our minds and actions in ways that no physical representation can influence physical phenomena.

In other words, in the case of the physical, there is a clear separation between the representation and the thing represented. By contrast, in the case of the mental, the representation is, often enough, part of the thing represented.

Others have suggested that social cognition is for shaping our own and others’ minds (we are trying to fit ourselves to various normative standards rather than to make predictions). Meanwhile still others follow Philippe Rochat in thinking that ...

‘Social cognition is ... primarily a means to be connected ... with others, enjoying rather dreading one another, overcoming tensions, gaining respect, buidling trust, getting our ways.’ \citep[p.~303]{rochat:2009_commentary}

Davidson puts the point like this:

‘in physics there is a mind at work making as much sense as possible of a subject matter that is being treated as brainless;
in the psychological case, there is a brain at each end.’

\citep[p.~12]{Davidson:1995nl}

Davidson (1995, 12)

How, if at all, is the fact of such reciprocity significant?

textbook:

none

Things are a bit wild on this course. There’s no textbook that we’re following to guide us through these questions. No one else is even quite asking exactly the questions I want us to ask. The idea is to explore a set of interlocking ideas in search of a theory.

Admin

lectures

lectures are usually but not always here at this time every week.

web there is a web page where you can find slides and handouts from lectures. and lecture capture

assessment = essays

The authoritative source for the deadlines is your undergraduate handbook. In case of doubt, please check there.

--- 15% <1,501 words

--- 85% <2,501 words

(titles on the web under ‘course materials’)

reading week

there are not normally lectures or seminars in reading week (week 6)

seminars

Seminars start next week and run every week except reading week.

seminar groups

seminar tasks

--- ...

Tasks are on yyrama ...

suggestions

Timetable problems

week 3 (Thu 25th Jan)

? week 4 (Thu 1st Feb)

week 9 (Thu 8th Mar)

Radical Interpretation*

\section{Radical Interpretation*}

A fundamental project in theorising about social cognition is to provide an account radical interpretation*. An account of radical interpretation* is an account of how you could in principle infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence.

radical interpretation*

Infer The Mind from The Evidence

The Mind: facts about actions, desires, beliefs, emotions, perspectives ...

The Evidence: facts about events and states of affairs that could be known without knowing what any particular individual believes, desires, intends, ...

Here we must be careful. Donald Davidson and David Lewis have both used the term ‘radical interpretation’. But Lewis is interested in how what I am calling ‘The Evidence’ determines facts about the mind. This is a *metaphysical* question. By contrast, Davidson is interested in the possibility of inferring The Mind from The Evidence. He is not assuming---and, I think, does not belive, that the Evidence metaphysically determines The Mind (although he’s sometimes interpreted as so believing). Davidson’s project (and the part of Dennett’s we’re interested in) is epistemological, not metaphysical.

[NB: this is particularly important because we’re talking about Dennett]

I’ll add a star to the name to show that the project I have in mind isn’t necessarily the same project as others have used the term ‘radical interpretation’ for.

The Intentional Stance

\section{The Intentional Stance}

Dennett doesn’t use the term ‘radical interpretation’ nor is he interested in the project. His aims are, as far as I can tell, entirely different.

Nevertheless, his description of the Intentional Stance does provide a candidate account of radical interpretation. Or at least it can be \textbf{constructively misinterpreted} as providing an account of radical interpretation*.

In philosophy as in other areas of life, wombling is an excellent strategy.

People often remember the line about wombles making good use of things (in this case, philosophical theories) folk have left behind. But there’s a better line ...

‘We're so incredibly, utterly devious

Making the most of everything.

[...]

Pick up the pieces and make them into something new,

Is what we do!’

‘the intentional stance ...

‘first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent;

‘then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have , given its place in the world and its purpose.

‘Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations,

‘and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs’

Dennett (1987, 17)

\citep[p.~17]{Dennett:1987sf}

A couple of things about this are confusing.

First, what is the purpose of me?

Second, where do these goals come from? Does Dennett mean desires here?

This does make sense to me. Dennett derives this rule from the fundamental injunction to attribute all the beliefs the agent ought to have:

‘one rule for attributing beliefs in the intentional strategy is this: attribute as beliefs all the truths relevant to the system's interests (or desires) that the system's experience to date has made available’ \citep[p.~18]{Dennett:1987sf}

But what about the desires? Which desires ought we to have? Here Dennett is less helpful.

I prefer gold rings to platinum ones; you prefer the converse. Does one of us have the wrong preferences?

‘We attribute the desires the system ought to have. That is the fundamental rule. It dictates, on a first pass, that we attribute the familiar list of highest, or most basic, desires to people: survival, absence of pain, food, comfort, procreation, entertainment.’ \citep[p.~20]{Dennett:1987sf}

He also suggests attributing desires for things we believe are good for us, or that will further other desires. From the context, I think Dennett’s idea is that, in essence, we all desire a small number of basic things but differ in our beliefs about how to get these.

Note that there are two components to Dennett’s view, a claim about Strategy and a claim about Radical Interpretation*. I want you to focus on the Strategy and ignore the metaphysics.

Strategy

... beliefs it ought to have ...

Metaphysics

The second component is a claim about what it is to have a belief.

The claim about metaphysics is of no interest to us at this point, although it is at the forefront of most discussions of Dennett; in my view, the claim about the metaphysics is no more or less plausible than comparable claims about models of physical systems (impetus mechanics or the weather). But we can reject or accept claims about the Strategy (radical interpretation*) independently of rejecting or accepting the metaphysical claim.

radical interpretation*

Infer The Mind from The Evidence

The Mind: facts about actions, desires, beliefs, emotions, perspectives ...

The Evidence: facts about events and states of affairs that could be known without knowing what any particular individual believes, desires, intends, ...

This is why I’m stressing that the project of radical interpretation* is to give an account of how we could infer the Mind from the Evidence. It’s not about how one determines the other.

‘the intentional stance ...

‘first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent;

‘then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have , given its place in the world and its purpose.

‘Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations,

‘and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs’

Dennett (1987, 17)

Social Cognition vs Radical Interpretation*

\section{Social Cognition vs Radical Interpretation*}

So why are we interested in the Intentional Strategy at all?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

(This is a way of asking, How is radical interpretation* relevant given that our topic is social cognition?)

An account of radical interpretation* describes a route to knowledge starting from evidence that can be described without knowing anything about the particular actions, beliefs, desires and other mental states of any individual and ending with knowledge of these particulars.

What could
Dennett’s Intentional Stance
((mis)interpreted as a theory of radical interpretation*)
tell us about social cognition?

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

A theory of social cognition is (in part) a theory of the processes by which we actually predict, understand, align with and shape each other.

What do these two things have to do with each other?

Sometimes when you read Davidson and Dennett, it seems like an account of radical interpretation* just is a theory of social cognition ...

‘Do people actually use this strategy? Yes, all the time.’

\citep[p.~21]{Dennett:1987sf}

Dennett (1987, p. 21)

‘[a]ll understanding of the speech [and thoughts] of another involves radical interpretation’

\citep[p.~125]{Davidson:1973jx}

Davidson (1973, 125)

\citet[p.~22ff]{Marr:1982kx} distinguishes:

\begin{itemize}

\item computational description---What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?

\item representations and algorithms---How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?

\item hardware implementation---How are the representations and algorithms physically realised?

\end{itemize}

One possibility is to appeal to David Marr’s famous three-fold distinction bweteen levels of description of a system: the computational theory, the representations and algorithm, and the hardware implementation.

This is easy to understand in simple cases. To illustrate, consider a GPS locator. It receives information from four satellites and tells you where on Earth the device is.

There are three ways in which we can characterise this device.

1. computational description

First, we can explain how in theory it is possible to infer the device’s location from it receives from satellites. This involves a bit of maths: given time signals from four different satellites, you can work out what time it is and how far you are away from each of the satellites. Then, if you know where the satellites are and what shape the Earth is, you can work out where on Earth you are.

-- What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?

The computational description tells us what the GPS locator does and what it is for. It also establishes the theoretical possibility of a GPS locator.

But merely having the computational description does not enable you to build a GPS locator, nor to understand how a particular GPS locator works. For that you also need to identify representations and alogrithms ...

2. representations and algorithms

At the level of representations and algorthms we specify how the GPS receiver represents the information it receives from the satellites (for example, it might in principle be a number, a vector or a time). We also specify the algorithm the device uses to compute the time and its location. The algorithm will be different from the computational theory: it is a procedure for discovering time and location. The algorithm may involve all kinds of shortcuts and approximations. And, unlike the computational theory, constraints on time, memory and other limited resources will be evident.

So an account of the representations and algorithms tells us ...

-- How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?

3. hardware implementation

The final thing we need to understand the GPS locator is a description of the hardware in which the algorithm is implemented. It’s only here that we discover whether the device is narrowly mechanical device, using cogs, say, or an electronic device, or some new kind of biological entity.

-- How are the representations and algorithms physically realised?

The hardware implementation tells us how the representations and algorithms are represented physically.

Marr (1992, 22ff)

How is this relevant to my question? My question was, What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

I suggest that an account of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition; it tells us what social cognition is for and how, in the most abstract sense, it is possible.

‘Do people actually use this strategy? Yes, all the time.’

Dennett (1987, p. 21)

‘[a]ll understanding of the speech [and thoughts] of another involves radical interpretation’

Davidson (1973, 125)

‘The approach to the problems of meaning, belief and desire which I have outlined is not, I am sure it is clear, meant to throw any direct light on how in real life we come to understand each other’

Davidson (1980, 12)

This is why Davidson says that a theory of radical interpretation isn’t ‘meant to throw any direct light on how in real life we come to understand each other’. What he means is that it isn’t about the representations and algorithsm, nor about the hardware implementation--the neurophysiology in our case--of social cognition.

But he’s also right that all ‘[a]ll understanding of the speech [and thoughts] of another involves radical interpretation’. This follows trivially from the fact that a theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to be a computational description of social cognition.

Finally, the view I’m offering (a theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition) makes sense of a puzzle about Dennett’s claim that people use the Intentional Strategy all the time. The puzzle is to understand how he could know this without doing some research. The answer, I think, is that Dennett’s Intentional Stance, like any theory of radical interpretation*, isn’t a theory about how individuals understand each other; it is a theory about what it is to understand each other---that is, a computational description of social cognition.

I’ve been arguing that

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

If this is right, then an account of radical interpretation* makes a fundamental contribution to the study of social cognition.

Radical Interpretation*:

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

aside: simulation theory vs theory theory

Simulation theory and theory theory are theories about REPRESENTATIONS AND ALGORITHMS, not about the COMPUTATIONAL DESCRIPTION. For this reason, you could accept Davidson’s theory about radical interpretation* while taking any view on simulation vs theory. The issues ([1]radical interpretation* and [2] simulation vs theory) are only indirectly related.

level	social cognition
computational description (What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?)	theory of radical interpretation*
representations and algorithms (How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?)	simulation, ‘theory theory’, ...
hardware implementation	TPJ, ...

next: challenges and objections ...

Now we know what a theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to do for us, let’s consider whether there are objections to Dennett when we (mis)interpret his Intentional Strategy as a theory of radical interpretation* ...

conclusion

The domain: what is a theory of social cognition a theory of?

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

The question: Radical Interpretation*

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

Keyboard Shortcuts?

Lecture 01:

Social Cognition

[email protected]

Admin

Radical Interpretation*

The Intentional Stance

Social Cognition vs Radical Interpretation*

Keyboard Shortcuts`?`