\title {Social Cognition \\ Lecture 04}
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\def \ititle {Lecture 04}
\def \isubtitle {Social Cognition}
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\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
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\section{Mindreading Intro}
\section{Mindreading Intro}
Some Evidence
\section{Some Evidence}
\section{Some Evidence}
Hare et al (2001, figure 1)
In this experiment by Brian Hare and colleagues, a subordinate chimpanzee makes predictions about a
dominant chimpanzee’s ability to retrieve food. They found that the subordinate’s predictions take
into account whether the dominant’s view was blocked while the food was placed. This could be
explained by the Third Principle. For the subordinate to predict that the dominant will not be able
to recover the food, it is sufficient to think: because the dominant did not encounter the food,
she will not be able to retrieve it.
‘In informed trials dominant individuals witnessed the experimenter hiding
food behind one of the occluders whereas in uninformed trials they could
not see the baiting procedure. In misinformed trials, dominants witnessed
the experimenter hiding food behind one of the occluders, and once the
dominant’s visual access was blocked, the experimenter switched the food
from its original location to the other occluder’ \citep{Hare:2001ph}.
Hare et al (2001, figure 2b)
‘Mean percentage ±SE of ... (b) trials in which subordinate subjects chose not
to approach as a function of whether the dominant competitor was informed,
uninformed, or misinformed about the location of the food in experiment 1.’
Clayton et al, 2007 figure 11
Clayton et al, 2007 figure 12
‘the jays were much more likely to re-cache if they had been observed by a conspecific while they
were caching than when they had cached in private. By re-caching items that the observer had seen
them cache, the cachers significantly reduce the chance of cache theft, as observers would be unable
to rely on memory to facilitate accurate cache theft’ \citep[p.~516]{Clayton:2007fh}.
Bugnyar et al, 2016 figure 1
First show that window open vs window closed affects caching behaviour.
Then familiarise ravens with the peephole, letting them use it while humans
cache and letting them ‘steal’ the human-cached food.
Now test them by allowing them to cache when there’s apparently (from the sound,
which is actually a recording)
a raven on the other side.
Bugnyar et al, 2016 figure 2a
Conclusion 1:
‘Peephole designs can allow researchers to overcome the confound of gaze cues’ \citep{bugnyar:2016_ravens}.
‘ravens can transfer knowledge from their own experience in a novel context---using peepholes to look
into an adjacent room---to a caching situation in which they can hear but not see a conspecific in that
room’ \citep{bugnyar:2016_ravens}.
Bugnyar et al, 2016 figure 1
Tracking vs Representing Mental States
\section{Tracking vs Representing Mental States}
\section{Tracking vs Representing Mental States}
Not all theory of mind abilities depend on theory of mind cognition.
For example, preening others may be worthwhile in part because
it influences their attitudes towards oneself and thereby
strengthens social bonds \citep{Clayton:2007ob}.
Where this is so, preening is a theory of mind ability.
It doesn’t follow, of course, that preening involves theory of
mind cognition.
One might be driven to preen others without understanding that
preening is worthwhile because it influences others’ attitudes.
The Question, version 0.1
\section{The Question, version 0.1}
\section{The Question, version 0.1}
Many animals including scrub jays \citep{Clayton:2007fh},
ravens \citep{bugnyar:2016_ravens},
goats \citep{kaminski:2006_goats},
dogs \citep{kaminski:2009_domestic},
ringtailed lemurs \citep{sandel:2011_evidence},
monkeys \citep{burkart:2007_understanding, hattori:2009_tufted}
and chimpanzees \citep{melis:2006_chimpanzees,karg:2015_chimpanzees} reliably vary their actions in ways that are appropriate given facts about another’s mental states.
What could underpin such abilities to track others’ mental states?
The Behaviour Reading Demon
\section{The Behaviour Reading Demon}
\section{The Behaviour Reading Demon}
Hare et al (2001, figure 1)
Recall this experiment.
Could we explain success without appeal to the idea that chimpanzees
can ascribe knowledge and ignorance?
Nonhuman Mindreading: The Logical Problem
\section{Nonhuman Mindreading: The Logical Problem}
\section{Nonhuman Mindreading: The Logical Problem}
Lurz & Krachun 2011, figure 1
There’s a competitor, two graps and some size-distorting glass ... can
Subject predict that Competitor will choose not the largest grape but
the one which appears largest?
‘The objective here is to test whether chimpanzees are capable of anticipating (as evidenced by their
looking behavior) the actions of a human competitor by understanding how an illusory stimulus (grape)
looks to the human.’ \citep{lurz:2011_how}
‘the competitor is absent when the grapes are placed inside the containers (as in the pretest stage),
he does not observe the change in apparent size of the grapes as they are placed inside the
containers, as the chimpanzee does. After the grapes are placed, the competitor enters the room, sits
at the table, looks at each grape through the sides of the containers’
\citep[p.~476]{lurz:2011_how}
‘dependent measure is anticipatory looking’.
In this case, the subjects (chimps) know which grape is which and how they appear.
Also a Krachun-like competitive version (in this case, the chimps have to
infer which is larger from the failed reach of the human competitor)...
Also a Krachun-like reaching measure:
‘After the competitor has acted in one of these two ways toward the container with the large grape,
the experimenter places opaque coverings completely over each container and moves the platform toward
the chimpanzee. Once the platform is in place before the chimpanzee, the chimpanzee is allowed to
choose one of the two containers (by pointing to it through a finger hole). Since the containers are
covered, the chimpanzee cannot make its choice by seeing the grape or grapes inside the containers.
Rather, to make its preferred choice (which we assume will be the remaining small grape in
competitor-first success trials and the large grape in competitor-first failure trials) the chimpanzee
must attend to the selection process of the competitor.’
\citep[p.~475]{lurz:2011_how}
Karg et al, 2015 figure 4 (Experiment 2)
Experiment 2: chimp attempts to steal from human,
who will remove food if she sees the chimp approach.
One cover is transparent, the other opaque. But actually when they are down,
both look opaque from the chimp’s point of view.
Karg et al, 2015 figure 5 (Experiment 2)
(This is just a photo of the apparatus, with covers up (top) and down (bottom).)
Karg et al, 2015 figure 5 (Experiment 2)
‘Mean percentage of trials with the choice of the opaque box across the three conditions. In the
transparent condition, one lid was opaque, the other transparent. In the screen condition, one lid
was a screen, the other opaque. The control was like the transparent condition, but without the
experimenter's presence at the time of choice. Error bars indicate 95% CI. The horizontal line
indicates chance level (50%). *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01’
\citep{karg:2015_goggles}.
conclusion
In conclusion, ...