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\title {Social Cognition \\ Lecture 09}

\maketitle

Lecture 09:

Social Cognition

[email protected]

\def \ititle {Lecture 09}

\def \isubtitle {Social Cognition}

\begin{center}

{\Large

\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle

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The domain: what is a theory of social cognition a theory of?

Social cognition:

cognition of
others’ actions and mental states
in relation to social functioning.

Our goal for this course: construct a theory of social cognition. But what questions does such a theory aim to answer.

The question: Radical Interpretation*

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

In every case, we are linking of social cognition as involving an observer and a target. We make no use at all of the observer being able to interact with the target. In fact, for all the theories demand, the observer could be on another planet ...

Reciprocity

\section{Reciprocity}

reciprocity

Why suppose, in advance of considering the details, that interaction might provide us with routes to knowledge of other minds? [*todo: replace talk of mindreaders!] A mindreader's target is often also a mindreader and may sometimes reciprocate by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading.

reciprocity

It ought to be possible, in mindreading, to make use of this reciprocity. But how could such reciprocity facilitate mindreading? If we assume the mindreader is merely observing her target, that there is manifestly no potential for interaction, then it seems that any way of exploiting reciprocity would involve higher-order ascriptions.

reciprocity

The mindreader would ascribe to her target beliefs (say) about the mindreader's own beliefs and other mental states.

reciprocity

And if her target reciprocates, she might escalate by ascribing to the target beliefs about her own beliefs about the target's beliefs about her beliefs. While this might be useful in some situations,

reciprocity

the nesting this approach requires quickly becomes dauntingly complex. And the basic intuition about reciprocal mindreading goes unsatisfied.

reciprocity

without escalation

Reciprocal mindreading should sometimes result in something like a meeting of minds rather than an escalation of higher-order ascriptions. Perhaps fully exploiting reciprocity in mindreading requires the mindreaders to be in a position to interact with each other; perhaps in some cases being or appearing poised to interact can somehow enable mindreaders to exploit reciprocity without first having to ascribe higher-order mental states. This is the hunch we develop in what follows.

\section{Interacting Interpreters}

Could interacting interpreters be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers?

Contrast an interpreter who is, or appears to be, capable of interacting with her targets and an interpreter who can manifestly only observe. Is it possible that the interacting interpreter is in a position to know things which she would be unable to know if she were unable to interact with her targets?

I believe the answer is yes ... But how could we argue for a positive answer?

Step 1: Which obstacle to knowledge?

Step 1: Which obstacle to knowledge could capacities for interaction overcome?

Step 2: How?

Step 2: How could capacities for interaction enable interpreters to overcome or avoid this obstacle to knowledge?

Obstacle: opaque means impair goal ascription

The problem of opaque means: failures to identify to which ends actions are means can impair goal ascription.

e.g. pram -> bus; gorilla preparing nettles

While wriggling the pram, it looks a lot like she’s trying to throw the baby out, or as if she’s attacking the bus. More prosaically, it’s also hard to tell whether her goal is to extract the pram from the bus or to get it on.

The case of Byrne’s Rwandan mountain gorilla’s preparing stinging nettles is another good case; it might well be hard for an unskilled observer to recognise to which end these actions are means.

e.g. tool use

The use by another of an unfamiliar tool to achieve something. For example, maybe she has a novel-to-you tool for hulling rice which involves throwing it into the air; not recognizing this tool’s function you are puzzled by her action and unable to identify it’s goal.

OK, so opaque means impair goal ascription. But why do they do so? Reflection on the teleological stance already gives us the answer ...

Why do opaque means impair goal ascription?

‘an action can be explained by a goal state if, and only if, it is seen as the most justifiable action towards that goal state that is available within the constraints of reality’

\citep[p.~255]{Csibra:1998cx}

Csibra & Gergely (1998, 255)

1. action a is directed to some goal;

2. actions of a’s type are normally means of realising outcomes of G’s type;

3. no available alternative action is a significantly better* means of realising outcome G;

4. the occurrence of outcome G is desirable;

5. there is no other outcome, G′, the occurrence of which would be at least comparably desirable and where (2) and (3) both hold of G′ and a

Therefore:

6. G is a goal to which action a is directed.

To make this inference, you have to know which outcomes an action is a means of realising. Where the problem of opaque means arises, this is exactly what you don’t know.

So the problem of opaque means prevents you from using the teleological stance to identify the goals of an action.

Obstacle: opaque means impair goal ascription

The problem of opaque means: failures to identify to which ends actions are means can impair goal ascription.

e.g. pram -> bus; gorilla preparing nettles

e.g. tool use

e.g. communicative actions

The problem of opaque means also affects communicative actions because these characteristically have goals which the actions are means to realising only because others recognise them as means to realising those goals (a Gricean circle).

\emph{A Gricean circle} communicative actions characteristically have goals which the actions are means to realising only because others recognise them as means to realising those goals.

To illustrate, you have to imagine that you didn’t understand pointing. We can take a step towards this by imagining landing on a planet where people point to things with their shoulders rather than their fingers, and where the shoulders are turned to a location 35 degrees westwards of the object. It might take a while to figure out that some shoulder movements are pointing gestures.

Could interacting interpreters be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers?

Step 1: Which obstacle to knowledge?

Step 2: How?

My question is, Could interacting interpreters be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? I suggested that answering this question involves two steps.

The first step was to identify an obstacle to knowledge which capacities for interaction could overcome. I’ve just done this: the obstacle is the problem of opaque means. (Which is this: Failures to identify to which ends actions are means can impair goal ascription.)

The second step is to explain how capacities for interaction could enable interpreters to overcome or avoid this obstacle to knowledge.

I want to argue that interacting interpreters have a route to knowledge of others’ goals which avoids the problem of opqaue means ...

Your goal is my goal

\section{Your goal is my goal}

An outcome is a \emph{collective goal} of two or more actions involving multiple agents just if the actions are directed to this goal and this is not, or not just, a matter of each action being individually directed to that goal.

collective

Jack’s and Ayehsa’s actions are collectively directed to developing a vaccine for Zika

not collective

Ilsa and Ahmed’s actions are each individually directed to developing a vaccine for Zika

Those speakers collectively provide high fidelity reproduction.

Each of those speakers individually provides high fidelity reproduction

collective goal : an outcome to which our actions are collectively directed

joint action : an action with a collective goal

In what follows I’m going to rely on two assumptions: (1) joint actions involve collective goals (2) you can identify something as a joint action without ascribing any mental states.

intuitive idea, not quite right

Here is an intuitive idea that doesn't quite work: if an interpreter is engaged in an interaction with her target that involves a collective goal, it may be easy for the interpreter to know what the goal of her target's actions is because this goal is the goal of her own actions. So if she knows the goal of her own actions and she knows that she is engaged with her target in an interaction involving a collective goal, then she already knows what the goal of her target's actions are.

Roughly speaking, the mindreader can reason about her target thus: your goal is my goal.

Of course this intuitive idea is no use it stands. For the inference it captures relies on the premise that the interpreter and her target are engaged in actions with a collective goal. But for the mindreader to know this premise it seems she must already know which goal her target's actions are directed to.

but: cues to joint action

Fortunately there is a way around this. For there are various cues which signal that one agent is prepared to engage in some joint action or other with another, and joint actions involve collective goals. \label{twin_pram} Seeing you struggling to get your twin pram onto a bus and noticing you have the haggard look of a new parent, a passing stranger grabs the front wheels and makes eye contact with you, raising her eyebrows and smiling. (The noise of the street rules out talking.) In this way she signals that she is about to act jointly with you. Since you are fully committed to getting your pram onto the bus, you know what the sole goal of your own actions will be. But you also know that the stranger will engage in joint action with you, which means that, taken together, her actions and your actions will have a collective goal. This may enable you to infer the goal of the stranger's imminent actions: her goal is your goal, to get the pram onto the bus.

\begin{enumerate} \label{your_goal_is_my_goal} \item You are about to attempt to engage in some joint action\footnote{ We leave open the issue of how joint action is to be characterised subject only to the requirement that all joint actions must involve collective goals. Attempts to characterise joint action in ways relevant to explaining development include \citet{Tollefsen:2005vh}, \citet{Carpenter:2009wq}, \citet{pacherie_framing_2011} and \citet{Butterfill:2011fk}. } or other with me. %(for example, because you have made eye contact with me while I was in the middle of attempting to do something). \item I am not about to change the single goal to which my actions will be directed. \end{enumerate} % Therefore: % \begin{enumerate}[resume] % \item A goal of your actions will be my goal, the goal I now envisage that my actions will be directed to. \end{enumerate}

Your-goal-is-my-goal

1. You are about to attempt to engage in some joint action or other with me.

For example, because you have made eye contact with me while I was in the middle of attempting to do something)

2. I am not about to change the single goal to which my actions will be directed.

Therefore:

3. A goal of your actions will be my goal, the goal I now envisage that my actions will be directed to.

I claim (i) you could know the premises without already knowing the conclusion, and (ii) knowing the premises could put you in a position to know the conclusion. So the inference is a route to knowledge.

It describes how interacting interpreters might come to know facts about the goals of others’ actions.

The teleological stance is one route to knowlegde of other’s goals, and this is another.

The two routes to knowledge are complementary: one demands knowledge of means-ends relations and so is no good when the means are opaque to the interpreter; the other places different demands on the interpreter.

	teleological stance	your-goal-is-my-goal
demands know means	✓	✗
demands can interact	✗	✓

What about the problem of opaque means?

I claim that your-goal-is-my-goal enables you to avoid the problem of opaque means. But how does it work?

Earlier I mentioned three examples. Let’s see how your-goal-is-my-goal enables you to avoid the problem of opaque means in each of these three cases.

e.g. pram -> bus; gorilla preparing nettles

e.g. tool use illustrates inversion of demands

e.g. communicative actions

Actually I already did this one in introducing the inference.

We saw earlier that the problem of opaque means may impair goal ascription where actions involve novel uses for tools. How could your-goal-is-my-goal mitigate the problem in such cases? Imagine we are interacting with a young child, Ayesha, and want her to understand how a new tool is used. It is difficult to convey this to her directly. So we first get her interested in achieving an outcome that would require the new tool, knowing that she will perform actions directed to achieving this outcome. We then signal to Ayesha that we will act jointly with her. Now she is in a position to know what the goal of our action will be when we deploy the tool. She is able to identify this goal despite being unable to recognize it as an end to which our tool-using action is a means. She is able to identify this goal because she knows that this is her goal and that we were attempting to engage in joint action with her. This is one illustration of how interacting interpreters have at their disposal ways of identifying the goals of actions involving novel uses of tools which are unavailable to interpreters who can only observe.

As this example indicates, exploiting your-goal-is-my-goal can shift the burden of identifying goals from a mindreader to her target. In the example Ayesha is the focal mindreader and we are her target; but her success in identifying the goal of our actions depends on this, that our willingness to act jointly with her is based on \emph{our} knowledge of the goals of \emph{her} actions. In purely observational mindreading, the target's beliefs about the goals of the mindreader's actions are not normally relevant (except, of course, when the mindreader is ascribing such beliefs). But interacting mindreaders who rely on your-goal-is-my-goal thereby rely on their targets' having correctly identified the goals of their actions. Of course this is sometimes a reason not to rely on your-goal-is-my-goal. But where the target understands relevant means-ends relations, such as actions involving novel tools, the your-goal-is-my-goal route to knowledge of others' goals may sometimes be the only option.

This is a bit of a problem ...

My question was ...

Could interacting interpreters be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers?

I’ve argued that the answer is yes.

A thesis about interaction and social cognition

Some routes to knowledge are closed to interpreters who rely exclusively on observation but open to interacting interpreters.

Have we vindicated the rough intuition about interaction enabling a meeting of minds? Clearly not. There’s much more to do on this; I suspect the observer paradigm is a source of big problems. But so far my attempts to investigate this, including by organising a bit workshop, haven’t got very far.

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

Sharing a Smile

\section{Sharing a Smile}

Emotions unfold

[FIRST POINT: emotions unfold over time] When it comes to knowledge of others’ emotions, it might initially seem hard to imagine there could be a role for joint action because mere observation provides so much. Because there are characteristic expressions of emotion, a mere observer can know of Lily’s amusement just from her facial expression. Expressions of emotion plausibly also enable us to identify the objects of others’ emotions. Since the causes of expressions like Lily’s smile are often enough the objects of the emotions they express, we can identify the objects of emotion using whatever sorts of causal reasoning enable us to work out what someone tripped over. If you know what is causing Lily to smile you are probably in a position to know what she is amused by, that is the object of her amusement.

Emotions are not simply happiness or fear; they are things that unfold over time. That initial jolt of fear as you hear the intruder enter your house is becomes intense as she moves closer, and then acquires an angry edge as you hear her breaking that vase your grandmother gave you. Or imagine watching a clown falling over. Your amusement might develop from an initial wince to growing hilarity that abruptly ends as the clown hits the floor, only to resurge as the wider comic significance of this event becomes apparent.

How could we gain insight into the fine-grained dynamics of others’ emotions? How could we ever appreciate the unfolding of another’s grief, or the way their engagement leads to an explosion of ecstasy at the climax of a concert? It's in answering this question that I think we may find support for the idea that collective intentionality enables us to know things about others' emtoions that we might not otherwise be in a position to know. My thesis will be that Sharing a smile provides us with a route to knowledge of facts about the ways others' emotions unfold; this is what's special, rather than knowledge of the category of emotion (amusement vs fear) or its object.

You won’t remember, but this was one of my four objections to the claim that Davidson’s account of radical intepretation provides a fully adequate computational theory for social cognition in humans. The objection goes like this ...

Percepetion may yield categorical emotions (fear, surprise) and their objects. But it is probably not a way of knowing how others’ emotions are unfolding.

1. On the Intentional Stance, the outputs of social cognition are (i) propositional attitude ascriptions and (ii) action predictions.

2. Emotions unfold ...

3. ... and this is not comprehensible as a series of changes in propositional attitudes.

So: 4. Understanding the way emotions unfold is not a matter of ascribing propositional attitudes or predicting actions.

But: 5. Humans do sometimes understand how anothers’ emotions are unfolding.

So: 6. The Intentional Stance is not a fully adequate computational description of human social cognition.

How do humans ever understand how anothers’ emotions are unfolding?

Control is a way of knowing.

[SECOND POINT: control is a way of knowing]

ways of knowing: perception, inference, reason, testimony

ways of knowing --- mention perceiving, testimony etc;

agent’s knowledge of their current and future actions is often thought to depend on control (although I guess perception is important---it's not a pure case);

but control can enable us to know things about others’ actions (using reins as an example---the point of putting a toddler in reins is sometimes that they enable you to know where the toddler will be without observation or inference);

\footnote{

Issue (Joel): does control give knowledge of action independently of perception. (I launched into AHP, which I think only ends up supporting the point.) Perception must be relevant in this sense: to know that I’m acting, my judgement must be appropriately sensitive to perceptual confirmation. (Someone with AHP isn’t in a position to know that she’s acting precisely because the perceptual information doesn’t influence her judgement (the comparator---the link between perceptual feedback and motor representation---is broken). (Strictly this doesn’t show that we need perceptual information, just that knowing isn’t compatible with ignoring perceptual information if we have it.) OK, but how does this affect the argument? (i) maybe I shouldn’t offer agential control as a way of knowing that is distinct from perception (although I think that, unlike simple cases of perception, the motor representation plays a role in knowing. Further (ii) what’s perceived is action not emotion in the proposal I make; but then maybe Joel’s objection is that merely controlling isn’t sufficient for knowing---against this, I think the reins example might help (I don’t need perceptual feedback to know the location of the toddler, although I might not be able know the location if I have perceptual feedback and ignore it.)

}

then point out that social interactions often involve reciprocal control.

controlling someone's actions is a way of knowing things about them.

\footnote{

Issue (Tom Smith): is reciprocal control sufficient for joint control? No because of walking in the Tarantino sense. This might tell us something interesting about joint control---e.g. maybe identifying differences between sharing a smile and walking in the Tarantino sense with respect to control will enable me to make the point about control as a way of knowing in sharing a smile better.

}

Smiling is sometimes a goal-directed action, a goal of which is to smile a smile

[THIRD POINT: smiling is a goal-directed action, the goal of which is to smile that smile]

My topic is sharing a smile. But first think about ordinary, individual actions like genuine smiles.

What distinguishes a genuine smile from a muscle spasm or the exhalation of wind?

I want to suggest that it's this: the smile is a goal-directed action where the goal is to simile that smile.

But why think of the smile as goal-directed? Because smiling the smile requires considerable motor coordination: it’s not a matter of simple muscle contractions but more like the production of a phonetic gesture where context affects what is needed to realise the smile.

Further, like grasping an object or articulating a particular phoneme, it is an action that can be realised by different bodily movements in different contexts.

This is why I put slides of two quite different but both genuine smiles.

[Objection:]

Now you might say that the smile can't be goal-directed because is isn't explicable by appeal to belief, desire and intention

This is because the genuine smile is spontaneous and not something that can be produced at will (although it could probably be inhibited, at least to some extent); after all, this is what distinguishes the genuine from the polite smile.

\footnote{

From web source: The Duchenne smile involves both voluntary and involuntary contraction from two muscles: the zygomatic major (raising the corners of the mouth) and the orbicularis oculi (raising the cheeks and producing crow's feet around the eyes). The zygomatic major can be voluntarily contracted but many people can't voluntarily contract the orbicularis oculi muscle.

}

So now we might be tempted by the view that a smile is merely caused by an emotion in the way that gasses can cause you to burp.

[Reply:]

Maybe there are smiles like this, but some genuine smiles are sustained.

And what sustains them is a process of controll

How could this be if such smiles are not consequences of beliefs, desires and intentions?

I think a reasonably natural view here is to think that part of what makes an event a smile, a goal-directed action and not just a muscle spasm caused by excess wind, is the way that motor control is involved. Specifically, the genuine smile will involve a motor representation of the outcome, the smile, and this motor representation will lead to movements by way of planning-like motor processes.

But you don't have to buy this to agree with me.

All you have to accept is that actions like some smilings can be goal-directed and controlled even in the absence of relevant beliefs, desires and intentions.

I think smiles fall into the category of actions like graspings, reachings and gesturings which are goal-directed but do not necessarily involve intention.

So far, then, I've suggested that smiling is a goal-directed action, the goal of which is to smile that smile.

I'm sorry if all of this is too simple to mention, but I want to recap just to be sure we're all together.

summary so far

emotions unfold over time
control is a way of knowing
smiling is sometimes a goal-directed action, a goal of which is to smile a smile

Expressions of emotion can affect the ways emotions unfold \citep{wood:2016_fashioninga,niedenthal:2010_simulation}.

Now imagine a situation where a single individual encounters and event (a clown’s falling) which causes amusement which causes her to smile

Note that the smile also modulates the emotion; if, for example, she supressed the smile, the quality of her amusement would change.

How could we gain insight into the fine-grained dynamics of others’ emotions?

How could we ever appreciate the unfolding of another’s grief, or the way their engagement leads to an explosion of ecstasy at the climax of a concert?

Part of the answer is obvious: by being there, with them.

[Not that this is the only possibility --- in some cases we might be told.]

But how exactly does being there, in the same situation help?

Merely being in the same situation is surely not enough.

It’s not enough that we each experience amusement, grief or ecstasy.

After all, individuals are different. Different individuals’ feelings don’t unfold in the same way just because they are in the same situation.

It’s just here that collective intentionality is relevant.

\textbf{What is involved in sharing a smile?}

What is involved in sharing a smile?

Minimally, I think there have to be two kinds of connection between us for us to share a smile.

First, the way your smile unfolds is shaped by how mine unfolds and conversely.

I also suppose that our smiles can be minutely coordinated with each other.

But it’s not just that our smiles are interdependent in this way ...

It’s also that each of our smiles is shaping the way our amusement unfolds.

So the way your amusement unfolds is being controlled by, and controlling, the way mine unfolds.

In sharing a smile, we are emotionally locked together.

\begin{enumerate} \item What I’m feeling controls, and is controlled by, what you are feeling \end{enumerate} Therefore: \begin{enumerate}[resume] \item You are feeling what I am feeling. \end{enumerate} And: \begin{enumerate}[resume] \item Reciprocal control of expression or emotion has a charactersitic phenomenology. \end{enumerate} Therefore: \begin{enumerate}[resume] \item If I know what what I am feeling, I am in a position to know what you are feeling. \end{enumerate}

[*todo: remove motor stuff for this talk! Also: don't lose sight of idea that control is a way of knowing.]

[*todo: need slide with control arrows highlighted (my emotion controls yours).]

[*Structure: (i) I know because my emotion controls yours; (ii) But if my emotion controls yours, how can yours be amusement at the clown's falling? because control is partial, and reciprocal; (iii) But the mere fact of control isn't enough for knowledge; rather, control must show up in experience somehow. After all, for all I have said so far, we might, in sharing a smile, be unaware that our emotions are locked together. (iv) There must be an experience that is distinctive of sharing a smile. (iv) Note that I don’t want to say that someone who is sharing a smile needs to understand the situation in the way I’m describing it. All I'm claiming is that the fact of reciprocal control somehow affects our awareness. (v) It may affect in our awareness insofar as we are sensitive to contingencies between our own actions' and others' actions, and between our actions and the causes of them. (vi) So my position is this: the reciprocal control justifies each agent in making judgements about how the others' amusement is unfolding, and this justification is at least indirectly available to the agents by virtue of their having experiences characteristic of sharing a smile. ]

Our being emotionally locked together means that to a significant extent I am feeling what you are feeling, that the way my amusement is unfolding matches they way your amusement is unfolding. So if you know how your own amusement is unfolding and you know that we are emotionally locked together, you can know much about how my amusement is unfolding. So joint expressions of emotion like sharing a smile have the potential to enable us to know not just that others are amused but how their amusement is unfolding.

But the fact of reciprocal control (which means our emotions are locked together) together doesn’t all by itself mean that we can know how each other’s emotions are unfolding. After all, for all I have said so far, we might, in sharing a smile, be unaware that our emotions are locked together. Now you might think this sounds implausible because its hard to imagine sharing a smile without an experience that is distinctive of sharing a smile. And it might be natural to describe this experience as an experience of sharing. But even if that is correct, it’s necessary to say exactly why someone who is sharing a smile is in a position to know things about how the other’s emotion is unfolding.

I don’t want to say that interaction only helps if you know that your emotions are locked together. That is, I don’t want to say that someone who is sharing a smile needs to understand the situation in the way I’m describing it. But minimally the fact of reciprocal control must somehow feature in our awareness.

[*The idea in outline: \begin{enumerate} \item the ways our amusements unfold is locked together \item this is in part because a single motor plan has two functions, production of your smile and prediction of my smile \item the single motor process means that we might experience being locked together in some way (not that our emotions are locked together but that our actions are, in something like (but not exactly) we experience actions when seeing ourselves in a mirror or on CCTV (check Johannes’ discussion of this)). \end{enumerate} ]

Here I want to offer a wild conjecture. In joint expressions of emotion there is a single motor plan with two functions, production and prediction. The motor plan both produces your own smile and enables you to predict the way the other’s smile will unfold. [*missing step about monitoring and experience. (The Haggard idea: motor planning can give rise to experiences concerning one's own actions \citep{Haggard:2005sc}.)] Because your plan has this dual function, your experience of the other’s (my?) smile is special. From your point of view, it is almost as if the other is smiling your smile.% \footnote{ Joel caricatured this idea seeing me eating fruit: ‘it’s almost as if I’m eating that fruit.’ } This means that sharing a smile has characteristic phenomenology.

This odd phenomenological effect means that in sharing a smile we can each think of the situation almost as if there were a single smile. And almost as if there were a single state of amusement. (In thinking of the situation like this it is important that we have a subject-neutral conception of the amusement and an agent-neutral conception of the smile.% \footnote{ Tom Smith asked about this. I clarified that I wasn’t suggesting there was a state of amusement which is ours, nor that the subjects are thinking of the situation in this way. That’s the point of the appeal to subject-neutral amusement. It’s a partial model of the situation. } [*Here I think I’m shifting back from the perspective of the participants in sharing a smile to the perspective of the theorist. Probably what I should say is, first, that a theorist can think of the situation in this way and use this to argue, second, that there is a simple, partial conception of the situation that doesn’t require understanding reciprocal control and interlocking emotions but is sufficient for each smiler to have knowledge of the way the other’s emotion unfolds.] So my suggestion is that in sharing a smile you experience my smile almost as if it were yours (or: you experience me almost as if I were smiling your smile), and so you might also experience our situation almost as if it involved a single state of amusement.

It's more like we each plan a single smile.

But---to reply to the objection---these plans have a dual function. Your plan both produces your own smile and enables you to simulate---to experience---my smile. And likewise for my plan. The interdependence of our smilings means that we could each think of the situation as if it were one in which a single state of amusement were responsible for our actions.

Observer observes Target

control: Processes and representations in Target determine how she thinks, feels and acts.

simulation: Processes and representations occur in Observer which would occur if she were as Target is.

--- These are typically isoalted to some degree from Observer’s thought, feelings and actions.

sharing a smile: control is simulation

Are you feeling what I am feeling?

How can we sensibly answer this question? Often we can. What underpins our ability to answer this question is what underpins the sharing-a-smile inference

Conclusion: Observation may enable us to know things about the category of others’ emotions (fear vs joy, say), but interaction opens a route to knowing how others’ emotions unfold.

interaction takes us beyond observation:

from categories of emotion to the ways emotions unfold

I've just been arguing that manifestations of collective intentionality enable us to know things about others' minds that we might not otherwise be in a position to know. In particular, I suggested that sharing a smile provides us with a route to knowledge of facts about the ways others' emotions unfold. \textbf{ Engaging in collective actions like sharing a smile (and crying together) enables us to understand others’ emotions in ways that we probably couldn’t understand them if we were mere observers and unable to engage in collective action. The joint expression of emotion matters because it makes available a perspective from which it is almost as if your amusement is my amusement, and my grief is yours. }

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

It’s possible to fit these ideas about sharing a smile into the overall project of constructing theories of radical interpretation ...

control is simulation ∴ your feeling is my feeling

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

\section{Conclusions} \begin{enumerate}

computational descriptions

Recall David Marr’s famous three-fold distinction between levels of description of a system: the computational theory, the

This is easy to understand in simple cases. To illustrate, consider a GPS locator. It receives information from four satellites and tells you where on Earth the device is.

There are three ways in which we can characterise this device.

1. computational description

First, we can explain how in theory it is possible to infer the device’s location from it receives from satellites. This involves a bit of maths: given time signals from four different satellites, you can work out what time it is and how far you are away from each of the satellites. Then, if you know where the satellites are and what shape the Earth is, you can work out where on Earth you are.

-- What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?

The computational description tells us what the GPS locator does and what it is for. It also establishes the theoretical possibility of a GPS locator.

But merely having the computational description does not enable you to build a GPS locator, nor to understand how a particular GPS locator works. For that you also need to identify representations and alogrithms ...

2. representations and algorithms

At the level of representations and algorthms we specify how the GPS receiver represents the information it receives from the satellites (for example, it might in principle be a number, a vector or a time). We also specify the algorithm the device uses to compute the time and its location. The algorithm will be different from the computational theory: it is a procedure for discovering time and location. The algorithm may involve all kinds of shortcuts and approximations. And, unlike the computational theory, constraints on time, memory and other limited resources will be evident.

So an account of the representations and algorithms tells us ...

-- How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?

3. hardware implementation

The final thing we need to understand the GPS locator is a description of the hardware in which the algorithm is implemented. It’s only here that we discover whether the device is narrowly mechanical device, using cogs, say, or an electronic device, or some new kind of biological entity.

-- How are the representations and algorithms physically realised?

The hardware implementation tells us how the representations and algorithms are represented physically.

Marr (1992, 22ff)

For philosophy, a central project in social cognition (maybe the project for philosophers) is constructing computational descriptions of processes.

\item A central project in social cognition for philosophers is constructing computational descriptions of processes.

perceptually encountering mental states

Humans probably enjoy categorical perception of actions directed to the expression of particular emotions.

\item Humans probably enjoy categorical perception of actions directed to the expression of particular emotions.

mindreading

\item

In adult humans,

there are two (or more) distinct mindreading processes

which rely on different models of minds and actions.

nonhuman animals

\item

The available evidence already justifies concluding that humans are not unique in being able to represent mental states.

interaction

\item

Interacting interpreters can be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers.

\item

Existing attempts to provide computational descriptions (Davidson’s Radical Interpretation, Dennett’s Intentional Stance) are inadequate.

process architecture

\item The process architecture of social cognition matters for philosophical approaches to social cognition.

The process architecture of social cognition matters ...

- perceptual processes

- automatic, nonperceptual processes

- nonautomatic, nonperceptual processes

- ...

horizontal distinction : e.g. categorical emotion vs belief-tracking

vertical distinction : e.g. automatic vs nonautomatic belief-tracking

fragmentation

Many processes, therefore many different computational descriptions.

\item The process architecture of social cognition is fragmented.

fragmentation in the theory of radical interpretation

Not one big theory (like Davidson and Dennett), but many small ones

Dennett, Davidson

New Approach

One big theory for all social cognition.

Different theory for each kind of process.

Success : theory is coherent and descriptively adequate

Success : theory generates correct predictions

Method : pure reason

Method : signature limits

Constructing theories of radical interpretation* requires

respecting the process architecture of social cognition

and identifying testable predictions

using the method of signature limits

The domain: what is a theory of social cognition a theory of?

Social cognition:

cognition of
others’ actions and mental states
in relation to social functioning.

The question: Radical Interpretation*

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

the end

\end{enumerate}

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

Davidson’s Theory of Radical Interpretation

\section{Davidson’s Theory of Radical Interpretation}

\begin{center} \includegraphics[scale=0.3]{img/radical_interpretation_handout.png} \end{center}

radical interpretation*

Infer The Mind from The Evidence

The Mind: facts about actions, desires, beliefs, emotions, perspectives ...

The Evidence: facts about events and states of affairs that could be known without knowing what any particular individual believes, desires, intends, ...

I’m still not completely happy that I’ve properly explained the evidence which is the starting point. Perhaps this is a better way to put it: the evidence is evidence that you could possess in advance of knowing what any particular individual believes, desires, intends and so on.

I’ve just been saying that Dennett’s account of the Intentional Strategy isn’t much use as an accounnt of radical interpretation because it doesn’t explain what sort of evidence would be useful in inferring facts about minds. Fortunately Davidson’s theory is more illuminating ...

Evidence:

At time t, Ayesha comes to hold ‘Sta piovendo’ true because it’s raining.

Holding true is an attitude Ayesha has to a sentence. To hold a sentence true is to have a belief. So the evidence we are starting with is really evidence about beliefs. But, importantly, can know that Ayesha holds a sentence true without knowing what the sentence means and so without knowing what Ayesha believes.

So evidence of this kind is evidence that is in principle available to a radical interpreter at the start.

The ‘p’ picks out a proposition; it may be that Ayesha holds this sentence true because it is raining, because her eyes are open, and because there are splashes in the puddle on the roof outside her window.

Note that we are interested not in which sentences Ayesha holds true but in what causes here to change her beliefs---what causes her to come to hold a sentence true.

At any particular time there will be many propositions p such that Ayesha comes to hold S true because p. As already mentioned, Ayesha comes to hold the sentence ‘It is raining’ true because it is raining, because she has her eyes open and because there are splashes in the puddle on the roof outside her window.

There is, then, no hope of inferring what Ayesha believes from a single change in Ayesha’s holding a sentence true.

But we can consider many different events of Ayesha coming to hold a sentence true at different times. Consider, for instance, that on one occasion Ayesha comes to hold the sentence ‘It is raining’ true because she has her eyes open. On another occasion, she comes to hold this sentence true while cycling through an intense storm; on this occasion, the fact that she has her eyes open plays no role in her coming to hold the sentence ‘It is raining’ true.

Generalisation:

Ayesha comes to hold ‘Sta piovendo’ true because it’s raining.

The evidence confirms or falsifies a generalisation of the form, Ayesha comes to hold S true because p.

The hope is this: if we have enough evidence, we will find that the only generalisation supported by all the evidence is this one: Ayesha comes to hold the sentence ‘It is raining’ true because it is raining.

This is unrealistic, of course. However Davidson’s theory doesn’t strictly require this because sentences are things with structure. They contain elements, the words, which reoccur in different sentences. Davidson exploits this in making his theory of radical interpretation much more sophisticated than the simplified version I am describing, and avoiding the implausible notion that we would observe Ayesha coming to hold each sentence true millions of times. But we can ignore the complication as it won’t be central to our interests in social cognition (it would be more relevant for philosophy of language).

So, idealising and simplifying, we have lots of evidence which, for each of many sentences like ‘It’s raining’, supports a unique generalisation about why Ayesha comes to hold that sentence true. For example, the only generalisation supported by all the evidence for the sentence ‘It’s raining’ is the one that says Ayesha holds this sentence true because it’s raining.

Assumption:

Ayesha’s beliefs are true

We already saw that this assumption is required by Dennett’s Intentional Strategy. The assumption allows us to draw a conclusion about meaning:

Conclusion:

‘Sta piovendo’ is true if and only if it’s raining.

For our purposes you could replace this by ‘S means that p’, if you believed in meanings. (There are good reasons for appealing to truth conditions but they aren’t central on this course.)

... so when Ayesha comes to hold ‘Sta piovendo’ true, she comes to believe that it’s raining.

Why is Davidson’s a better theory?

Because it specifies the evidence from which radical interpretation can start, and because it allows us to connect multiple events and so at least have a chance of distinguishing different errors someone might make.

How can it be elaborated?

--- exploit sentence structure

--- include desire

What are its limits?

--- no use for wordless targets

--- bold assumption about evidence

Can we really know which events are events of Ayesha coming to hold a particular sentence true in advance of knowing anything about her mind and actions? On the face of it, holding true will involve an intententional action!

Objections to Davidson’s Theory of Radical Interpretation

\section{Objections to Davidson’s Theory of Radical Interpretation}

(1) No account of social cognition when the targets are wordless agents.

Minds without words

Dennett: his account is fine for targets of interpretation who lack words, but it offers no way of exploiting evidence about linguistic behaviours in his account of radical interpretation.

Davidson: his view has the converse weakness. (Why is this a weakness? Our inability to use words in communicating with an alien species would not necessarily prevent us from coming to know much about their minds and actions.)

An adequate theory of radical interpretation ought to avoid both weaknesses: it should characterise inferences for targets of interpretation without words, and it should characterise the additional complexities for radical interpretation entailed by the use of words.

(2) No account of non-propositional mental phenomena, such as the unfolding of emotions.

Emotions unfold

What is the point of being there with someone while it’s happening to her? Being there with someone often enables you to know and to regulate---and even to share, sometimes---what she’s feeling. ...

Why is this an objection to the claim that Davidson’s accounnt of Radical Interpretation is a fully adequate computational description of social cogntion in humans? Let me explain ...

1. On Radical Interpretation (and the Intentional Stance), the outputs of social cognition are (i) propositional attitude ascriptions and (ii) action predictions.

2. Emotions unfold ...

3. ... and this is not comprehensible as a series of changes in propositional attitudes.

So: 4. Understanding the way emotions unfold is not a matter of ascribing propositional attitudes or predicting actions.

But: 5. Humans do sometimes understand the way anothers’ emotions are unfolding.

So: 6. Radical Interpretation (and the Intentional Stance) is not a fully adequate computational description of human social cognition.

(3) Indeterminacy of reference

Indeterminacy of reference

On Davidson’s account of radical interpretation, we can think of its upshot as an assignment of propositions to sentences. The propositions give the truth conditions, or meanings, of the sentences and so enable us to identify the target’s beliefs and other propositional attitudes.

Because the evidence Davidson considers is attitudes towards whole sentences, it turns out that, for any assignment of propositions to sentences, there are ways of generating an alternative assigment of propositions to sentences which is exactly as well supported by the evidence as the original assignment of propositions to sentences is.

So on Davidson’s account of radical interpretation, there is no possibility of uniquely determining the truth conditions, or meanings, of sentences.

This is analogous to having a computational theory of a GPS device on which there is just no possibility of the device distinguishing between its being here and its being at the same point on the opposite side of the earth.

Let me illustrate how the indeterminacy arises ...

	ordinary	contrived
names	‘Beatrice’ refers to Beatrice	‘Beatrice’ refers to shadow-Beatrice
predicates	‘... is happy’ - is true of happy things	‘... is happy’ - is true of things that are the shadows of happy things

[Use Shoemaker’s shadows.]

Incidentally, a similar objection involving indeterminacy arises for Dennett.

What does the objection tell us? If I gave you a computational theory of the GPS device that suffered from indeterminacy, you would rightly reject that theory because the device can, as a matter of fact, determine which side of the planet it is on. But should we take the same attitude towards Davidson’s theory. He says not ...

‘It makes no sense, on this approach, to complain that a theory comes up with the right truth conditions time after time, but has the logical form (or deep structure) wrong. We should take the same view of reference.’

\citep[p.~223]{Davidson:1977kn}

Davidson (1977, p. 223)

But pointing ...

(4) A dilemma about The Evidence: actions or joint displacements

A dilemma about The Evidence: joint displacements or actions

The evidence Davidson starts from is changes in the attitude of holding a sentence true. To be detectable, such changes must involve the target of interpretation uttering a sentence. How are such events represented at the outset of radical interpretation?

If they are represented merely as sequences of joint displacements, bodily configurations and sounds, then we need an account of how it is determined which events are changes in the attitude of holding a particular sentence true.

If, on the other horn, they are represented as intentional actions, then we are presupposing some insight into the contents of the target of radical interpretation’s intentions. We know that she has an intention to express a particular attitude towards a particular sentence.

‘a radical interpreter is not, at the beginning of his study, informed about any of the basic propositional attitudes of his subject.’

\citep[p.~17]{Davidson:1984pr}

Davidson (1984, 17)

‘The important limitation is that [the radical interpreter] doesn’t know in detail the contents of any of the propositional attitudes of the person to be interpreted: she doesn’t know what he intends, believes, wants or means by what he says.’ \citep[p.~]{Davidson:1994ff}

Davidson might take this horn of the dilemma and just insist that his view of what an account of radical interpretation aims to achieve is a bit less exciting than I have been suggesting. It doesn’t start from no insight into what someone intends, just relatively little.

I think this response would be unsatisfactory given our interests in social cognition. The hardest part is surely to understand the step from *no* insight into others’ minds and actions to *some* such insight. If Davidson’s account of radical interpretation is really just about the step from *some* insight into others’ minds and actions to a bit more insight, it might be interesting but it isn’t the theory we were looking for. It won’t after all provide us with a computational theory of social cognition.

Can Davidson instead take the first horn of the dilemma and say that the changes in attitude are represented merely as sequences of joint displacements, bodily configurations and sounds?

He might insist that as long as there is some account of how we get from the joint displacement to the changes in attitude towards the sentence, there is no problem.

So on this horn, Davidson’s radical interpretation project is the computational theory of social cognition which we are looking for. But it is incomplete because it doesn’t include an account of the transition from joint displacements, bodily configurations and their effects (such as sounds) to changes in attitude towards the truth of sentences.

On the face of it, this doesn’t sound like there’s going to be an objection to Davidson here. But things get very interesting when we consider what is currently known about how this transition is made. Essentially, we will see that the capacities involved in getting from joint displacements, bodily configurations and their effects (such as sounds) to goal-directed actions provides a significant form of social cognition in its own right.

[This line of objection leads beautifully into speech perception and the motor theory!]

diagnosis

I think all of these objections arise from a single source. Davidson’s account of radical interpretation starts and ends with linguistic expressions of changes in attitudes towards whole sentences. It doesn’t consider simple object-directed actions like reaching for a mug or catching a ball, and it doesn’t consider nonlinguistic communicative activities like pointing; nor does it consider expressions of emotion like some smiles and grimaces.

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

The domain: what is a theory of social cognition a theory of?

Social cognition:

cognition of
others’ actions and mental states
in relation to social functioning.

Our goal for this course: construct a theory of social cognition. But what questions does such a theory aim to answer.

The question: Radical Interpretation*

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

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Lecture 09:

Social Cognition

[email protected]

Reciprocity

Your goal is my goal

Sharing a Smile

Davidson’s Theory of Radical Interpretation

Objections to Davidson’s Theory of Radical Interpretation

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