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Hare et al (2001, figure 1)
‘an intelligent chimpanzee could simply use the behavioural abstraction […]: ‘Joe was present and oriented; he will probably go after the food. Mary was not present; she probably won’t.’’
Povinelli and Vonk (2003)
For any food (x) and agent (y), if any of the following do not hold:
(i) the agent (y) was present when the food (x) was placed,
(ii) the agent (y) was oriented to the food (x) when it was placed,
(iii) the agent (y) can go after the food (x)
then probably not:
(iv) the agent (y) will go after the food (x).
Also, if all of (i)–(iii) do hold, then probably (iv).
‘Don't go after food if a dominant who is present has oriented towards it’
Penn and Povinelli (2007, 735)
The ‘Logical Problem’ ...
‘since mental state attribution in [nonhuman] animals will (if extant) be based on observable features of other agents’ behaviors and environment ... every mindreading hypothesis has ... a complementary behavior-reading hypothesis.
Lurz (2011, 26)