The Intentional Stance

Click here and press the right key for the next slide (or swipe left)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

Dennett doesn’t use the term ‘radical interpretation’ nor is he interested in the project. His aims are, as far as I can tell, entirely different.

Nevertheless, his description of the Intentional Stance does provide a candidate account of radical interpretation. Or at least it can be \textbf{constructively misinterpreted} as providing an account of radical interpretation*.

In philosophy as in other areas of life, wombling is an excellent strategy.

People often remember the line about wombles making good use of things (in this case, philosophical theories) folk have left behind. But there’s a better line ...

‘We're so incredibly, utterly devious

Making the most of everything.

[...]

Pick up the pieces and make them into something new,

Is what we do!’

‘the intentional stance ...

‘first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent;

‘then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have , given its place in the world and its purpose.

‘Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations,

‘and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs’

Dennett (1987, 17)

\citep[p.~17]{Dennett:1987sf}

A couple of things about this are confusing.

First, what is the purpose of me?

Second, where do these goals come from? Does Dennett mean desires here?

This does make sense to me. Dennett derives this rule from the fundamental injunction to attribute all the beliefs the agent ought to have:

‘one rule for attributing beliefs in the intentional strategy is this: attribute as beliefs all the truths relevant to the system's interests (or desires) that the system's experience to date has made available’ \citep[p.~18]{Dennett:1987sf}

But what about the desires? Which desires ought we to have? Here Dennett is less helpful.

I prefer gold rings to platinum ones; you prefer the converse. Does one of us have the wrong preferences?

‘We attribute the desires the system ought to have. That is the fundamental rule. It dictates, on a first pass, that we attribute the familiar list of highest, or most basic, desires to people: survival, absence of pain, food, comfort, procreation, entertainment.’ \citep[p.~20]{Dennett:1987sf}

He also suggests attributing desires for things we believe are good for us, or that will further other desires. From the context, I think Dennett’s idea is that, in essence, we all desire a small number of basic things but differ in our beliefs about how to get these.

Note that there are two components to Dennett’s view, a claim about Strategy and a claim about Radical Interpretation*. I want you to focus on the Strategy and ignore the metaphysics.

Strategy

... beliefs it ought to have ...

Metaphysics

The second component is a claim about what it is to have a belief.

The claim about metaphysics is of no interest to us at this point, although it is at the forefront of most discussions of Dennett; in my view, the claim about the metaphysics is no more or less plausible than comparable claims about models of physical systems (impetus mechanics or the weather). But we can reject or accept claims about the Strategy (radical interpretation*) independently of rejecting or accepting the metaphysical claim.

radical interpretation*

Infer The Mind from The Evidence

The Mind: facts about actions, desires, beliefs, emotions, perspectives ...

The Evidence: facts about events and states of affairs that could be known without knowing what any particular individual believes, desires, intends, ...

This is why I’m stressing that the project of radical interpretation* is to give an account of how we could infer the Mind from the Evidence. It’s not about how one determines the other.