The Topic

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the domain

What are theories of social cognition theories of?

‘For humans, like many animal species, survival depends on effective social functioning. Social skills facilitate our access to sustenance, protection and mates, and socially adept individuals tend to be healthier and live longer. However, social interaction in humans is exceedingly complex compared with that in other animal species: representations of internal somatic [action-guiding] states, knowledge about the self, perceptions of others and interpersonal motivations are carefully orchestrated to support skilled social functioning. This complex set of processes [...] is broadly referred to as social cognition’ \citep[p.~268]{amodio:2006_meeting}

‘For humans, like many animal species,
survival depends on effective social functioning. [...]

‘survival depends on effective social functioning’. I don’t think the importance of this point can be overstated, and I would go further. Selves, if distinct from animals, exist only as nodes in a social network. Take away the social and you are left without the people.

Humans are proudly selfish animals. Which is odd because to be proud of selfishness shows that you’ve misunderstood the deep interconnections between the existence of the self and its social network.

‘However, social interaction in humans is exceedingly complex compared with that in other animal species:

How so?

‘representations of
internal somatic [action-guiding] states,
knowledge about the self,
perceptions of others and
interpersonal motivations
are carefully orchestrated to support skilled social functioning.

This complex set of processes [...] is broadly referred to as social cognition’

Amodio & Frith, 2006 p. 268

What processes?

The authors have just mentioned representations, now they’re talking about processes. These are metaphysically distinct: processes unfold over time, whereas representations are states of things.

I think the ‘set of processes’ must refer to the processes involved in orchestrating these representations in the support of ‘skilled social functioning’.

[Working definition v1]

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

Working definition

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

How good is this working definition?

According to a textbook,

[q1] ‘One of the fundamental problems of social cognition is how we represent and understand other people.’

This fits nicely with our definition.

Todorov, Fiske and Prentice, 2011

\citep{todorov:2011_social}

But the textbook mentions another question ...

This question fits less well with our definition. The truth is, the term ‘social cognition’ is widely used in lots of different ways.

This course will focus, roughly, on the first question.

Our definition fits what we will do in this course, but doesn’t match what you will find in lots of textbooks.

This isn’t a matter of principle. My ultimate goal is to explore philosophical issues in social cognition. I’m not doing group identity just because I don’t yet know anything about it.

Note that we shouldn’t be persuaded that there is a problem yet.

What is a problem? It’s a question that is difficult to answer. What is it to grasp a problem? It is to understand both the question *and* what makes it difficult to answer.

The question is, How do we represent and understand other people? So far we’ve seen no difficulties in answering this question. As a matter of fact, it is difficult. But since we don’t yet understand the difficulties, we do not yet understand the problem.

OK, so I’m happy with our definition for now. All I’m stressing is that we don’t yet know what the problems are.

Working definition

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

While we’re thinking about how to define social cognition, consider another textbook definition ...

‘Social cognition is the study of how people make sense of other people and themselves’ \citep[p.~1]{fiske:2013_social}

vs:

‘Social cognition is the study of how people make sense of other people and themselves
‘... in order to coordinate with their social world’

Fiske and Taylor, 2013 pp. 1, 16

It’s a process, not a study

Appealing to ‘make sense’ is too intellectualist. A key theme in these lectures will be that whereas philosophers and others have standardly focussed on humans at their most reflective, a lot of social cognition is implicit. It involves perceptual and motor processes which are largely automatic. This is perhaps the great discovery about social cognition, and a key source of problems.

This is very cool. I would love to include the self. Philosophers have thought a lot about what the self might be (e.g. is it the animal). In doing this, they have largely neglected a very simple point. Philosophical views about the self are mainly based on guesses (or ‘intuitions’). These guesses have their roots in ordinary thinking about the self. So by studying that ordinary thinking about the self and its cognitive sources, we can get a better handle on what the self might be and why, if at all, we should value it.

So far, then, this is our working definition of social cognition.

Turn to the person nearest you. Is there anything unclear about this definition? Do you have any objections or questions about it?

Working definition

Social cognition:

The processes involved in
orchestrating representations of
actions and mental states
to support skilled social functioning.

I’m not entirely happy with our definition. I think it can be simplified.

Talk of ‘orchestrating representations’ sounds like we’re experts, but really most of us have no clue what either ‘orchestration’ or ‘representation’ pick out. (I just took this from the quote.)

Why skilled specifically?

And while we’re at it, why are we referring to processes here? Our interest is not in just any old process, but in cognitive processes specifically.

We can therefore simply and improve our definition

[Working definition v2]

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

Switching from talk of processes to cognition is helpful because it forces us to clarify what we mean by ‘cognition’, at least in a preliminary way.

What does ‘cognition’ mean? Sometimes the term ‘cognition’ is used in contrast to ‘perception’, ‘emotion’ or ‘motor process’. But not here.

In these lectures I’m using ‘cognition’ broadly. It includes processes underpinning perception, emotion and action.

the domain

What are theories of social cognition theories of?

So now we’ve answered one question. The question was about the domain of social cognition: What are theories of social cognition theories of?

The answer is given by our working definition.

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

some questions

What forms of social cognition are there?

What forms of social cognition are there? As already mentioned, there has been a lot of emphasis, especially in philosophy, on the sort of intellectual powers characteristic of humans at their most reflective. This is the ‘sherlock holmes’ form of social cognition.

But much research shows that not all of social cognition is of the ‘sherlock holmes’ form. One challenge for us is to identify other forms of social cognition? For example, can we perceive mental states? And are the processes involved in action control also involved in social cognition?

Recognising that there are multiple forms of social cognition raises further questions. In particular, How do different forms of social cognition have synergistic effects?

Do any nonhumans track others’ mental states?

How could interaction support social cognition?

What are the functions of social cognition?

It is perhaps tempting to assume that the function of social cognition is simply to produce an accurate representations of others’ minds and actions.

By comparison: the key function of physical cognition is to enable you to produce, as efficiently as possible, representations of the physical world which are as accurate as possible.

Can we think of social cognition in the same way? Is the key function of social cognition to enable you to produce, as efficiently as possible, representations of the mental world which are as accurate as possible?

In line with this view, some people think social cognition primarily for predicting others’, and perhaps for explaining their actions.

But one reason for thinking that it might not be is reflection on norms. Think about norms of rationality, ethical norms governing actions. Representions of minds and actions are shot through with norms. These can influence our minds and actions in ways that no physical representation can influence physical phenomena.

In other words, in the case of the physical, there is a clear separation between the representation and the thing represented. By contrast, in the case of the mental, the representation is, often enough, part of the thing represented.

Others have suggested that social cognition is for shaping our own and others’ minds (we are trying to fit ourselves to various normative standards rather than to make predictions). Meanwhile still others follow Philippe Rochat in thinking that ...

‘Social cognition is ... primarily a means to be connected ... with others, enjoying rather dreading one another, overcoming tensions, gaining respect, buidling trust, getting our ways.’ \citep[p.~303]{rochat:2009_commentary}

Davidson puts the point like this:

‘in physics there is a mind at work making as much sense as possible of a subject matter that is being treated as brainless;
in the psychological case, there is a brain at each end.’

\citep[p.~12]{Davidson:1995nl}

Davidson (1995, 12)

How, if at all, is the fact of such reciprocity significant?

textbook:

none

Things are a bit wild on this course. There’s no textbook that we’re following to guide us through these questions. No one else is even quite asking exactly the questions I want us to ask. The idea is to explore a set of interlocking ideas in search of a theory.

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