Three questions:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Why is belief-tracking in adults sometimes but not always automatic?
\item How could belief-tracking ever be automatic given evidence that it depends on working memory and consumes attention?
\item Why are there dissociations in nonhuman apes’ performance on belief-tracking tasks?
\end{enumerate}
Incidentally, the dissociation in performance may well arise for nonhumans as well
as for humans.
Commenting on their success in showing that great apes can track false beliefs,
Krupenye et al comment that ...
‘the present evidence may constitute an implicit understanding of belief’
\citep[p.~113]{krupenye:2016_great}
Krupenye et al, 2016 p. 113
Krachun and colleagues
found some evidence for false belief tracking in chimps back in 2009
(which they downplayed), and also, using another measure, competitive object choice task,
they found insensitivity to others’ false beliefs.
Krachun et al, 2009 figure 2 (part)
Chimpanzee anticipatory looking indicates tracking others’ false beliefs.
“Looking. Our second measure was whether participants looked at least once at the container the
competitor was not reaching for during the couple of seconds it took E to slide the platform towards
them.” “Note that proportions are based only on trials in which participants chose the same
container as the competitor [ie: incorrect trials], and for apes in version A the measure was face
rather than eye orientation. Bars show standard error. * p < .05.”
Recall the construction of minimal theory of mind from last time
Also Edwards and Low, 2018 ...
Edwards and Low, 2017 figure 7a
Edwards and Low, 2017 figure 7a
Edwards and Low, 2017 figure 7a