Radical Interpretation Reprise

Click here and press the right key for the next slide (or swipe left)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

Radical Interpretation Reprise

The domain: what is a theory of social cognition a theory of?

Social cognition:

cognition of
others’ actions and mental states
in relation to social functioning.

Our goal for this course: construct a theory of social cognition. But what questions does such a theory aim to answer.

The question: Radical Interpretation*

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

I’ve told you what this is, but I’ll remind you in a moment.

radical interpretation*

Infer The Mind from The Evidence

The Mind: facts about actions, desires, beliefs, emotions, perspectives ...

The Evidence: facts about events and states of affairs that could be known without knowing what any particular individual believes, desires, intends, ...

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

‘the intentional stance ...

‘first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent;

‘then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have , given its place in the world and its purpose.

‘Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations,

‘and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs’

Dennett (1987, 17)

\citet[p.~22ff]{Marr:1982kx} distinguishes:

\begin{itemize}

\item computational description---What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?

\item representations and algorithms---How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?

\item hardware implementation---How are the representations and algorithms physically realised?

\end{itemize}

One possibility is to appeal to David Marr’s famous three-fold distinction bweteen levels of description of a system: the computational theory, the representations and algorithm, and the hardware implementation.

This is easy to understand in simple cases. To illustrate, consider a GPS locator. It receives information from four satellites and tells you where on Earth the device is.

There are three ways in which we can characterise this device.

1. computational description

First, we can explain how in theory it is possible to infer the device’s location from it receives from satellites. This involves a bit of maths: given time signals from four different satellites, you can work out what time it is and how far you are away from each of the satellites. Then, if you know where the satellites are and what shape the Earth is, you can work out where on Earth you are.

-- What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?

The computational description tells us what the GPS locator does and what it is for. It also establishes the theoretical possibility of a GPS locator.

But merely having the computational description does not enable you to build a GPS locator, nor to understand how a particular GPS locator works. For that you also need to identify representations and alogrithms ...

2. representations and algorithms

At the level of representations and algorthms we specify how the GPS receiver represents the information it receives from the satellites (for example, it might in principle be a number, a vector or a time). We also specify the algorithm the device uses to compute the time and its location. The algorithm will be different from the computational theory: it is a procedure for discovering time and location. The algorithm may involve all kinds of shortcuts and approximations. And, unlike the computational theory, constraints on time, memory and other limited resources will be evident.

So an account of the representations and algorithms tells us ...

-- How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?

3. hardware implementation

The final thing we need to understand the GPS locator is a description of the hardware in which the algorithm is implemented. It’s only here that we discover whether the device is narrowly mechanical device, using cogs, say, or an electronic device, or some new kind of biological entity.

-- How are the representations and algorithms physically realised?

The hardware implementation tells us how the representations and algorithms are represented physically.

Marr (1992, 22ff)

How is this relevant to my question? My question was, What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

I suggest that an account of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition; it tells us what social cognition is for and how, in the most abstract sense, it is possible.

The Intentional Stance
can be (mis)interpreted as an attempt to provide
a computational description of social cognition.

‘the intentional stance ...

‘first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent;

‘then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have , given its place in the world and its purpose.

‘Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations,

‘and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs’

Dennett (1987, 17)

1. Humans can distinguish each others desires in ways unrelated to their purpose and place in the world.

BUT

2. The Intentional Stance provides no way to do this.

3. The Intentional Stance does not provide a correct computational description of human social cognition.

Objection 1

The Intentional Stance provides
no way to identify
false beliefs, ‘incorrect’ desires or failures of rationality.

Objection 2

The Intentional Stance provides
no adequate way to
distinguish me from you.

1. Humans can sometimes identify false beliefs, ‘incorrect’ desires or failures of rationality.

BUT

2. The Intentional Stance provides no way to do this.

3. The Intentional Stance does not provide a correct computational description of human social cognition.

Objection 1

The Intentional Stance provides
no way to identify
false beliefs, ‘incorrect’ desires or failures of rationality.

Objection 2

The Intentional Stance provides
no adequate way to
distinguish me from you.

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

‘an action can be explained by a goal state if, and only if, it is seen as the most justifiable action towards that goal state that is available within the constraints of reality’

\citep[p.~255]{Csibra:1998cx}

Csibra & Gergely (1998, 255)

1. action a is directed to some goal;

2. actions of a’s type are normally means of realising outcomes of G’s type;

3. no available alternative action is a significantly better* means of realising outcome G;

4. the occurrence of outcome G is desirable;

5. there is no other outcome, G′, the occurrence of which would be at least comparably desirable and where (2) and (3) both hold of G′ and a

Therefore:

6. G is a goal to which action a is directed.

Objection 1

The Intentional Stance provides
no way to identify
false beliefs, ‘incorrect’ desires or failures of rationality.

Objection 2

The Intentional Stance provides
no adequate way to
distinguish me from you.

The Teleological Stance does not face objection 2 (no way to distinguish you from me), at least not at first pass.

What about objection 1? This is tricky. By construction the Teleological Stance provides no way to identify false beliefs, ‘incorrect’ desires or failures of rationality.

But is this an objection ... ?

1. Humans can sometimes identify false beliefs, ‘incorrect’ desires or failures of rationality.

BUT

2. The Teleological Stance provides no way to do this.

3. The Teleological Stance does not provide a correct computational description of human social cognition.

The Teleological Stance isn’t trying to be a comprehensive theory of human social cognition. The idea, rather, is that human social cognition has many parts and one of them is a process of pure goal ascription and the Teleological Stance provides a computational description for that.

Dennett, Davidson:

We need a single theory covering all social cognition.

A better approach:

Social cognition involves a cluster of disparate abilities.

These include pure goal ascription.

There is no such thing as a theory of social cognition.

Instead we need a theory for each disparate ability.

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

What do we perceptually experience of others’ mental states?

Evidence:

Humans have categorical perception of expressions of emotion.

Question:

Are expressions of emotion facial configurations?

Observation:

Facial configurations are not diagnostic of emotions (Aviezer et al)

Theory:

The objects of categorical perception are actions directed to the goals of expressing particular emotions (Butterfill, 2015).

Categorical perception of expressions of emotions

level	specification
computational description	The Teleological Stance
representations and algorithms	... are broadly perceptual

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

Btw, mTm is a description of a model of mind at the level of a computational theory; it is completely agnostic about representations and algorithms.

MTM overcomes both objections ... at a cost (it’s limited)

Objection 1

The Intentional Stance provides
no way to identify
false beliefs, ‘incorrect’ desires or failures of rationality.

Objection 2

The Intentional Stance provides
no adequate way to
distinguish me from you.

1. Humans can sometimes identify false beliefs involving mistakes about numerical identity.

BUT

2. Minimal Theory of Mind provides no way to do this.

3. Minimal Theory of Mind does not provide a correct computational description of human social cognition.

dogma

the first

of mindreading

The dogma of mindreading: any individual has at most one model of minds and actions at any one point in time.

The first dogma of mindreading: there is just one mindreading process ... so we need just one true theory of radical interpretation

dual-process recap

So what does a Dual Process Theory of Mindreading claim? The core claim is just this:

Dual Process Theory of Mindreading (core part)

Two (or more) mindreading processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

\textbf{You might say, this is a schematic claim, one totally lacking substance.} You’d be right: and that’s exactly the point.

A key feature of this Dual Process Theory of Mindreading is its \textbf{theoretical modesty}: it involves no a priori committments concerning the particular characteristics of the processes.

dogma

the first

of mindreading

The dogma of mindreading: any individual has at most one model of minds and actions at any one point in time.

The first dogma of mindreading: there is just one mindreading process ... so we need just one true theory of radical interpretation

Theories of radical interpretation*:

The Intentional Stance (Dennett)

Davidson’s Theory

The Teleological Stance & Your-Goal-Is-My-Goal

Minimal Theory of Mind

also an implicit theory associated with perception of emotion

The domain: what is a theory of social cognition a theory of?

Social cognition:

cognition of
others’ actions and mental states
in relation to social functioning.

Our goal for this course: construct a theory of social cognition. But what questions does such a theory aim to answer.

The question: Radical Interpretation*

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

Keyboard Shortcuts?

Radical Interpretation Reprise

Keyboard Shortcuts`?`