Three Responses to the Logical Problem

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Three Responses to the Logical Problem

The logical problem

‘since mental state attribution in [nonhuman] animals will (if extant) be based on observable features of other agents’ behaviors and environment ... every mindreading hypothesis has ... a complementary behavior-reading hypothesis.

‘Such a hypothesis proposes that the animal relies upon certain behavioral/environmental cues to predict another agent’s behavior

[... the behaviour which], on the mindreading hypothesis, the animal is hypothesized to use as its observable grounds for attributing the mental state in question.’

\citep[p.~26]{lurz:2011_mindreading}; also \citep[p.~453]{lurz:2011_how}

Lurz (2011, 26)

Do any nonhuman animals ever represent others’ mental states?

1. Representing others’ mental states depends on making a transition from behaviour to mental state.

2. For any hypothesis about mindreading there is a ‘complementary hypothesis’ about behaviour reading

3. The two hypotheses generate the same predictions.

4. No experiment can distinguish between them.

\begin{enumerate} \item It is not a logical problem at all, but one that should be resolved by better experimental methods. Therefore, we lack evidence for nonhuman mindreading (except maybe from ‘goggles’ and ‘mirror’ experiments) \item It is a merely logical problem (so a form of sceptical hypothesis). Therefore, we already have evidence for nonhuman mindreading \item It is an illusory problem, caused by a theoretical mistake. Therefore, we’re thinking about the issue in the wrong way \end{enumerate}

1. It is not a logical problem at all, but one that should be resolved by better experimental methods.

- we lack currently evidence for nonhuman mindreading
(except maybe from ‘goggles’ and ‘mirror’ experiments)

2. It is a merely logical problem (so a form of sceptical hypothesis).

- we already have evidence for nonhuman mindreading

3. It is an illusory problem, caused by a theoretical mistake.

- we’re thinking about the issue in the wrong way

‘Comparative psychologists test for mindreading in non-human animals by determining whether theydetect the presence and absence of particular cognitive states in a wide variety of circumstances.

They eliminate potential confounding variables by ensuring that there is no one observable state to which subjects might be responding’ \citep[p.~487]{halina:2015_there}.

Halina, 2015 p. 487

If we agree with Halina that the ‘Logical Problem’ is a logical problem, should we also accept her claim?

I don’t think we should. Researchers have so far focussed on a sceptical problem rather than a hypothesis, but I think this is a mistake.

The ‘Logical Problem’ is a sceptical problem

∴

the evidence supports mindreading?

Apes : anticipatory gaze depends on protagonists’ false belief (Krupnye et al, 2017)

Apes, goals : food avoidance differs depending on competitors’ (mis)information (Hare et al, 2001; Kaminski et al, 2006)

Apes : avoid being seen or making sounds when taking food (Melis et al, 2006)

Apes : will exploit facts about what others can see in mirrors or through screens (Karg et al, 2015; Lurz et al, 2018)

Corvids : caching differs depending what others can, or have, seen (Clayton et al, 2007; Bugnyar et al, 2016)

Dogs : responses to requests depend on what requester can see (Kaminski et al, 2009)

Ringtail lemurs, common marmosets : food avoidance depending on competitors’ line of sight (Sandel et al, 2011; Burkart & Heschl, 2007)

Should we really take all the evidence at face value?

For example, what about dogs?

Two versions of this objection: (a) cross-species: How confident are we that ringtailed lemurs are doing what chimpanzees are doing?

(b) within an individual: In humans and other animals, tracking mental states likely involves many different processes, including plenty of which that rely on simple cues.

‘Comparative psychologists test for mindreading in non-human animals by determining whether they detect the presence and absence of particular cognitive states in a wide variety of circumstances.

Halina, 2015 p. 487

You might say, it depends on having a wide variety of evidence, which we lack in the case of dogs, lemurs and marmosets. This is true. But why shouldn’t it be possible to track mental states in a wide variety of circumstances without actually representing them?

Requirement:

We can distinguish,

both within an individual

and between individuals,

mindreading which involves representing mental states

from

mindreading which does not.

Requirement 1: We need a theory that allows us to distinguish mental state tracking underpinned by mindreading from other forms of mental state tracking within an individual.

Halina’s positive proposal (as I’m interpreting it) fails to meet this requirement. (We agree on the negative part of the proposal : the logical problem is a sceptical issue, not an experimental challenge.)

1. It is not a logical problem at all, but one that should be resolved by better experimental methods.

- we lack currently evidence for nonhuman mindreading
(except maybe from ‘goggles’ and ‘mirror’ experiments)

2. It is a merely logical problem (so a form of sceptical hypothesis).

- we already have evidence for nonhuman mindreading

3. It is an illusory problem, caused by a theoretical mistake.

- we’re thinking about the issue in the wrong way

‘Nonhumans represent mental states’ is not a hypothesis

... or at least not one that generates readily testable predictions.

‘chimpanzees understand … intentions … perception and knowledge’

\citep[p.~191]{Call:2008di}

‘chimpanzees probably do not understand others in terms of a fully human-like belief–desire psychology’

Call & Tomasello (2008, 191)

‘the core theoretical problem in ... animal mindreading is that ... the conception of mindreading that dominates the field ... is too underspecified to allow effective communication among researchers’

‘the core theoretical problem in contemporary research on animal mindreading is that ... the conception of mindreading that dominates the field ... is too underspecified to allow effective communication among researchers, and reliable identification of evolutionary precursors of human mindreading through observation and experiment.’

\citep[p.~321]{heyes:2014_animal}

Heyes (2015, 321)

What does Heyes mean?

Think about what might anchor our understanding of knowledge? There seem to me to be two options.

(1) epistemology, which is not at all about how anyone thinks of knowledge (you know this because epistemologists don’t draw on research on how ordinary people ordinarily think about knowledge).

(2) theorising about adult humans’ mindreading abilities

The only computational theory we have is Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation.

‘Nonhumans represent behaviours only’
is also not a hypothesis

‘an intelligent chimpanzee could simply use the behavioural abstraction […]: ‘Joe was present and oriented; he will probably go after the food. Mary was not present; she probably won’t.’’

\citep{Povinelli:2003bg}

Povinelli and Vonk (2003)

What’s that?

‘because behavioural strategies are so unconstrained ...it is very difficult indeed, perhaps impossible, to design experiments that could show that animals are mindreading rather than behaviour reading.’

‘because behavioural strategies are so unconstrained ... it is very difficult indeed, perhaps impossible, to design experiments that could show that animals are mindreading rather than behaviour reading.’

\citep[p.~322]{heyes:2014_animal}

Heyes (2015, 322)

1. It is not a logical problem at all, but one that should be resolved by better experimental methods.

- we lack currently evidence for nonhuman mindreading
(except maybe from ‘goggles’ and ‘mirror’ experiments)

2. It is a merely logical problem (so a form of sceptical hypothesis).

- we already have evidence for nonhuman mindreading

3. It is an illusory problem, caused by a theoretical mistake.

- we’re thinking about the issue in the wrong way

Do you understand all three options? Which of these three do you think is correct?

Recall that this was the issue which led us to the ‘logical problem’

tracking vs representing mental states

What is observed: that nonhumans track others’ mental states.

Tracking mental states does not require representing them.

So:

How can we draw conclusions about what nonhumans represent?

What else have we learnt about the ‘Logical Problem’?

What does the ‘Logical Problem’ show?

Lurz, Krachun et al

The ‘Logical Problem’ can be overcome with better experimental design.

Its existence shows that these are the wrong experiments whereas those are the right ones.

The standard question:

Do nonhuman animals represent mental states or only behaviours?

Obstacle:

The ‘logical problem’ (Lurz 2011)

What could make others’ behaviours intelligible to nonhuman animals?

-- the teleological stance

What could make others’ mental states intelligible to nonhuman animals?

-- minimal theory of mind

Logical Problem: Summary

1. statement of what the problem is

2. three responses to the Logical Problem

My proposal :

3. it is a logical problem, not an experimental issue ...

4. ... but recognising this leaves open the question of what nonhumans represent.

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Three Responses to the Logical Problem

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