Social Cognition vs Radical Interpretation*

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Social Cognition vs Radical Interpretation*

So why are we interested in the Intentional Strategy at all?

What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

(This is a way of asking, How is radical interpretation* relevant given that our topic is social cognition?)

An account of radical interpretation* describes a route to knowledge starting from evidence that can be described without knowing anything about the particular actions, beliefs, desires and other mental states of any individual and ending with knowledge of these particulars.

What could
Dennett’s Intentional Stance
((mis)interpreted as a theory of radical interpretation*)
tell us about social cognition?

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

A theory of social cognition is (in part) a theory of the processes by which we actually predict, understand, align with and shape each other.

What do these two things have to do with each other?

Sometimes when you read Davidson and Dennett, it seems like an account of radical interpretation* just is a theory of social cognition ...

‘Do people actually use this strategy? Yes, all the time.’

\citep[p.~21]{Dennett:1987sf}

Dennett (1987, p. 21)

‘[a]ll understanding of the speech [and thoughts] of another involves radical interpretation’

\citep[p.~125]{Davidson:1973jx}

Davidson (1973, 125)

\citet[p.~22ff]{Marr:1982kx} distinguishes:

\begin{itemize}

\item computational description---What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?

\item representations and algorithms---How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?

\item hardware implementation---How are the representations and algorithms physically realised?

\end{itemize}

One possibility is to appeal to David Marr’s famous three-fold distinction bweteen levels of description of a system: the computational theory, the representations and algorithm, and the hardware implementation.

This is easy to understand in simple cases. To illustrate, consider a GPS locator. It receives information from four satellites and tells you where on Earth the device is.

There are three ways in which we can characterise this device.

1. computational description

First, we can explain how in theory it is possible to infer the device’s location from it receives from satellites. This involves a bit of maths: given time signals from four different satellites, you can work out what time it is and how far you are away from each of the satellites. Then, if you know where the satellites are and what shape the Earth is, you can work out where on Earth you are.

-- What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?

The computational description tells us what the GPS locator does and what it is for. It also establishes the theoretical possibility of a GPS locator.

But merely having the computational description does not enable you to build a GPS locator, nor to understand how a particular GPS locator works. For that you also need to identify representations and alogrithms ...

2. representations and algorithms

At the level of representations and algorthms we specify how the GPS receiver represents the information it receives from the satellites (for example, it might in principle be a number, a vector or a time). We also specify the algorithm the device uses to compute the time and its location. The algorithm will be different from the computational theory: it is a procedure for discovering time and location. The algorithm may involve all kinds of shortcuts and approximations. And, unlike the computational theory, constraints on time, memory and other limited resources will be evident.

So an account of the representations and algorithms tells us ...

-- How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?

3. hardware implementation

The final thing we need to understand the GPS locator is a description of the hardware in which the algorithm is implemented. It’s only here that we discover whether the device is narrowly mechanical device, using cogs, say, or an electronic device, or some new kind of biological entity.

-- How are the representations and algorithms physically realised?

The hardware implementation tells us how the representations and algorithms are represented physically.

Marr (1992, 22ff)

How is this relevant to my question? My question was, What is the relation between an account of radical interpretation* and a theory of social cognition?

I suggest that an account of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition; it tells us what social cognition is for and how, in the most abstract sense, it is possible.

‘Do people actually use this strategy? Yes, all the time.’

Dennett (1987, p. 21)

‘[a]ll understanding of the speech [and thoughts] of another involves radical interpretation’

Davidson (1973, 125)

‘The approach to the problems of meaning, belief and desire which I have outlined is not, I am sure it is clear, meant to throw any direct light on how in real life we come to understand each other’

Davidson (1980, 12)

This is why Davidson says that a theory of radical interpretation isn’t ‘meant to throw any direct light on how in real life we come to understand each other’. What he means is that it isn’t about the representations and algorithsm, nor about the hardware implementation--the neurophysiology in our case--of social cognition.

But he’s also right that all ‘[a]ll understanding of the speech [and thoughts] of another involves radical interpretation’. This follows trivially from the fact that a theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to be a computational description of social cognition.

Finally, the view I’m offering (a theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition) makes sense of a puzzle about Dennett’s claim that people use the Intentional Strategy all the time. The puzzle is to understand how he could know this without doing some research. The answer, I think, is that Dennett’s Intentional Stance, like any theory of radical interpretation*, isn’t a theory about how individuals understand each other; it is a theory about what it is to understand each other---that is, a computational description of social cognition.

I’ve been arguing that

A theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to provide a computational description of social cognition.

If this is right, then an account of radical interpretation* makes a fundamental contribution to the study of social cognition.

Radical Interpretation*:

How in principle could someone infer facts about actions and mental states from non-mental evidence?

Social cognition:

cognition of
actions and mental states
which supports social functioning.

aside: simulation theory vs theory theory

Simulation theory and theory theory are theories about REPRESENTATIONS AND ALGORITHMS, not about the COMPUTATIONAL DESCRIPTION. For this reason, you could accept Davidson’s theory about radical interpretation* while taking any view on simulation vs theory. The issues ([1]radical interpretation* and [2] simulation vs theory) are only indirectly related.

level	social cognition
computational description (What is the thing for and how does it achieve this?)	theory of radical interpretation*
representations and algorithms (How are the inputs and outputs represented, and how is the transformation accomplished?)	simulation, ‘theory theory’, ...
hardware implementation	TPJ, ...

next: challenges and objections ...

Now we know what a theory of radical interpretation* is supposed to do for us, let’s consider whether there are objections to Dennett when we (mis)interpret his Intentional Strategy as a theory of radical interpretation* ...

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Social Cognition vs Radical Interpretation*

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