Keyboard Shortcuts?

×
  • Next step
  • Previous step
  • Skip this slide
  • Previous slide
  • mShow slide thumbnails
  • nShow notes
  • hShow handout latex source
  • NShow talk notes latex source
‘since mental state attribution in [nonhuman] animals will (if extant) be based on observable features of other agents’ behaviors and environment ... every mindreading hypothesis has ... a complementary behavior-reading hypothesis.
‘Such a hypothesis proposes that the animal relies upon certain behavioral/environmental cues to predict another agent’s behavior
[... the behaviour which], on the mindreading hypothesis, the animal is hypothesized to use as its observable grounds for attributing the mental state in question.’
\citep[p.~26]{lurz:2011_mindreading}; also \citep[p.~453]{lurz:2011_how}
 
‘Behavior-reading animals can appeal only to ... reality-based, mind-independent facts, such as facts about agents’ past behavior or their current line of gaze to objects in the environment.
 
‘Mindreading animals, in contrast, can appeal to the subjective ways environmental objects perceptually appear to agents to predict their behavior.’
\citep[p.~469]{lurz:2011_how}
 
Experimental implementations: e.g. \citep{karg:2015_goggles}
 
‘“self-informed” belief induction variables [... are those] that, if the participant is capable of mentalizing, he or she knows only through extrapolation from her own experience to be indicative of what an agent can or cannot see and, therefore, does or does not believe’
\citep[p.~139]{heyes:2014_submentalizing}
 

Click here and press the right key for the next slide (or swipe left)