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Tracking vs Representing Mental States

Researchers sometimes use the term ‘theory of mind’.
‘In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual [can ascribe] mental states’
\citep[p.\ 515]{premack_does_1978}

Premack & Woodruff, 1978 p. 515

New term. Is this is the same thing as mindreading?
Mindreading : tracking others’ mental states

Which action an ape predicts another will perform

depends to some extent on

what the other sees, knows or believes.

theory of mind abilities

vs

theory of mind cognition

A \textit{theory of mind ability} \label{df:tom_ability} is an ability that exists in part because exercising it brings benefits obtaining which depends on exploiting or influencing facts about others’ mental states.
Not all theory of mind abilities depend on theory of mind cognition. For example, preening others may be worthwhile in part because it influences their attitudes towards oneself and thereby strengthens social bonds \citep{Clayton:2007ob}. Where this is so, preening is a theory of mind ability. It doesn’t follow, of course, that preening involves theory of mind cognition.
One might be driven to preen others without understanding that preening is worthwhile because it influences others’ attitudes.

Tracking mental states does not imply representing them.

Mindreading is the ability to track others’ mental states

Theory of mind ability

Mindreading is the ability to represent others’ mental states

Theory of mind cognition

A \textit{theory of mind ability} \label{df:tom_ability} is an ability that exists in part because exercising it brings benefits obtaining which depends on exploiting or influencing facts about others’ mental states.
This is evidence for mindreading = tracking; it is at best indirectly evidence for mindreading = representing.

Krupenye et al, 2016

‘In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual [can ascribe] mental states’
\citep[p.\ 515]{premack_does_1978}

(Premack & Woodruff 1978: 515)

Which action an ape predicts another will perform

depends to some extent on

what the other sees, knows or believes.

Theory of mind abilities are widespread

18-month-olds point to inform, and predict actions based on false beliefs.

Scrub-jays selectively re-cache their food in ways that deprive competitors of knowledge of its location.

Chimpanzees conceal their approach from a competitor’s view, and act in ways that are optimal given what another has seen.

18-month-old human infants point to inform \citep{Liszkowski:2006ec}, and predict actions based on false beliefs \citep{Onishi:2005hm,Southgate:2007js}.
Scrub-jays selectively re-cache their food in ways that deprive competitors of knowledge of its location \citep{Clayton:2007fh}.
Chimpanzees conceal their approach from a competitor’s view \citep{Hare:2006ih}, and act in ways that are optimal given what another has seen \citep{Hare:2001ph}.
The distinction between theory of mind abilities and cognition might help in describing some data. Scrub jays’ complex caching and infants’ imperative and declarative pointing are two behaviours which clearly manifest theory of mind abilities. It is a further question whether they also involve theory of mind cognition.
Eventually, we want to understand, What explains these abilities? But first, let’s see some evidence.