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Minds without words
1. On Radical Interpretation (and the Intentional Stance), the outputs of social cognition are (i) propositional attitude ascriptions and (ii) action predictions.
2. Emotions unfold ...
3. ... and this is not comprehensible as a series of changes in propositional attitudes.
So: 4. Understanding the way emotions unfold is not a matter of ascribing propositional attitudes or predicting actions.
But: 5. Humans do sometimes understand the way anothers’ emotions are unfolding.
So: 6. Radical Interpretation (and the Intentional Stance) is not a fully adequate computational description of human social cognition.
Indeterminacy of reference
|names||‘Beatrice’ refers to Beatrice||‘Beatrice’ refers to shadow-Beatrice|
|predicates||‘... is happy’ - is true of happy things||‘... is happy’ - is true of things that are the shadows of happy things|
‘It makes no sense, on this approach, to complain that a theory comes up with the right truth conditions time after time, but has the logical form (or deep structure) wrong. We should take the same view of reference.’
Davidson (1977, p. 223)
A dilemma about The Evidence: joint displacements or actions
‘a radical interpreter is not, at the beginning of his study, informed about any of the basic propositional attitudes of his subject.’
Davidson (1984, 17)