Interacting Interpreters

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Could interacting interpreters be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers?

Contrast an interpreter who is, or appears to be, capable of interacting with her targets and an interpreter who can manifestly only observe. Is it possible that the interacting interpreter is in a position to know things which she would be unable to know if she were unable to interact with her targets?

I believe the answer is yes ... But how could we argue for a positive answer?

Step 1: Which obstacle to knowledge?

Step 1: Which obstacle to knowledge could capacities for interaction overcome?

Step 2: How?

Step 2: How could capacities for interaction enable interpreters to overcome or avoid this obstacle to knowledge?

Obstacle: opaque means impair goal ascription

The problem of opaque means: failures to identify to which ends actions are means can impair goal ascription.

e.g. pram -> bus; gorilla preparing nettles

While wriggling the pram, it looks a lot like she’s trying to throw the baby out, or as if she’s attacking the bus. More prosaically, it’s also hard to tell whether her goal is to extract the pram from the bus or to get it on.

The case of Byrne’s Rwandan mountain gorilla’s preparing stinging nettles is another good case; it might well be hard for an unskilled observer to recognise to which end these actions are means.

e.g. tool use

The use by another of an unfamiliar tool to achieve something. For example, maybe she has a novel-to-you tool for hulling rice which involves throwing it into the air; not recognizing this tool’s function you are puzzled by her action and unable to identify it’s goal.

OK, so opaque means impair goal ascription. But why do they do so? Reflection on the teleological stance already gives us the answer ...

Why do opaque means impair goal ascription?

‘an action can be explained by a goal state if, and only if, it is seen as the most justifiable action towards that goal state that is available within the constraints of reality’

\citep[p.~255]{Csibra:1998cx}

Csibra & Gergely (1998, 255)

1. action a is directed to some goal;

2. actions of a’s type are normally means of realising outcomes of G’s type;

3. no available alternative action is a significantly better* means of realising outcome G;

4. the occurrence of outcome G is desirable;

5. there is no other outcome, G′, the occurrence of which would be at least comparably desirable and where (2) and (3) both hold of G′ and a

Therefore:

6. G is a goal to which action a is directed.

To make this inference, you have to know which outcomes an action is a means of realising. Where the problem of opaque means arises, this is exactly what you don’t know.

So the problem of opaque means prevents you from using the teleological stance to identify the goals of an action.

Obstacle: opaque means impair goal ascription

The problem of opaque means: failures to identify to which ends actions are means can impair goal ascription.

e.g. pram -> bus; gorilla preparing nettles

e.g. tool use

e.g. communicative actions

The problem of opaque means also affects communicative actions because these characteristically have goals which the actions are means to realising only because others recognise them as means to realising those goals (a Gricean circle).

\emph{A Gricean circle} communicative actions characteristically have goals which the actions are means to realising only because others recognise them as means to realising those goals.

To illustrate, you have to imagine that you didn’t understand pointing. We can take a step towards this by imagining landing on a planet where people point to things with their shoulders rather than their fingers, and where the shoulders are turned to a location 35 degrees westwards of the object. It might take a while to figure out that some shoulder movements are pointing gestures.

Could interacting interpreters be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers?

Step 1: Which obstacle to knowledge?

Step 2: How?

My question is, Could interacting interpreters be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? I suggested that answering this question involves two steps.

The first step was to identify an obstacle to knowledge which capacities for interaction could overcome. I’ve just done this: the obstacle is the problem of opaque means. (Which is this: Failures to identify to which ends actions are means can impair goal ascription.)

The second step is to explain how capacities for interaction could enable interpreters to overcome or avoid this obstacle to knowledge.

I want to argue that interacting interpreters have a route to knowledge of others’ goals which avoids the problem of opqaue means ...

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